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In the Matter of the Arbitration
between
Local 341 International Union of
Electrical, Radio and Machine
Workers, AFL-CIO
and
The Singer Company
Knitting Machinery Division

Award
and
Opinion

In accordance with Article XXIV of the Collective Bargaining Agreement dated June 19, 1968 between The Singer Company,
Knitting Machinery Division, hereinafter referred to as the
"Company," and Local 341, International Union of Electrical,
Radio and Machine Workers, AFL-CIO, hereinafter referred to
as the "Union," the Undersigned was designated as the Arbitrator to hear and decide the following stipulated issue;
Has the Company violated the Collective Bargaining
Agreement by assigning Production Dispatcher's
work to employees outside the bargaining unit. If
so, what is the remedy?
A hearing was held on February 3, 1969 at which time representatives of the Union and Company, hereinafter referred to
jointly as the "parties," appeared.

Full opportunity was

afforded all concerned to offer evidence and argument and to
examine and cross examine witnesses.

The Arbitrator's oath

was expressly waived; the parties filed post hearing statements; and the hearings were declared closed as of February
28, 1969.
On the facts I agree with the Company's contention that
the Dispatcher job is essentially clerical; that its duties
are neither the same nor similar to those performed by a

- 2 former bargaining unit "inner plant Dispatcher;" that its
duties are not the same as those presently performed by bargaining unit Expediters; and that its duties are among those
previously handled by the non-bargaining unit personnel of
the Production Control Group.
But despite these factual conclusions, I hold that under
the contract, the Dispatcher job belongs within the bargaining unit.
Clearly the non-bargaining unit employees of the Production Control Group were not excluded from the bargaining unit
because they did work now handled by the Dispatchers.

Rather

they were excluded because of other and more substantial duties
which are incontestably managerial in nature.

That the job

duties of the Dispatcher are different from those presently
performed by the bargaining unit Expediter and are significantly different from the assignments performed by the formerly
active bargaining unit classification of Inner Plant Dispatcher,
only means that the Dispatcher job is new.

And therefore the

question of whether it belongs within or has been properly
structured outside of the bargaining unit, turns on its duties
as a new classification and contractual recognition clause as
it applies to those duties.
The Company relies on the exclusion in the recognition
clause of "clerical (office) employees..."
I agree with the Company's interpretation that this exclusion is not limited to clerical employees located in "an
office" away from the factory floor.

Rather,though manifestly

applicable to the clerical work force so located (such as in

- 3 the Company's front office) it extends as well to similar
types of employees working elsewhere in the plant, even in
departments on the factory floor (such as the secretary of
the Inspection Department).

In my judgment, the exclusion

"clerical (office) employees" obtains to those employees who
perform office type of clerical work.

Or in other words those

whose clerical duties fall within the scope of what is traditionally accepted as "office work," irrespective of where
within the plant that work is performed.

So, only if the

duties of the Dispatcher are clerical within that meaning, has
the Company acted properly in excluding that job from the bargaining unit.
As I see it the exclusion of clerical (office) employees
applies to personnel and duties such as those of secretaries,
file clerks, typists, office machine operators, bookkeepers,
payroll employees and others of a similar class. I conclude
that the Dispatcher does not fall within that class of employee.
To my mind the distinction is both real and apparent.

Though

any number of explicit differences could be enumerated, I
deem it significant that the end result or product of clerical
work of a classical office type is the very clerical work itself; while the record keeping and reports of the Dispatcher
are nothing more than tools in improving the manufacture and
assembly of products on the factory floor.
The "clerical" duties of the Dispatcher are closely and
inextricably related to the actual production and assembly of
parts or the running of machines which produce parts, but relate only superficially if at all, to office type clerical work.

- 4In short the Dispatcher is a key aide in the direct physical
manufacture of the Company's product.

By keeping and acting

on certain records and reports, he assists in maintaining an
efficient and uninterrupted schedule of production.

As a

means to this end, his work, albeit clerical, is vastly different in both nature and purpose than what is traditionally
accepted as clerical work of an office type.

And because it

is the latter type which the Union sought to cover in the recent contract negotiations, the Union's failure to achieve
that demand is not prejudicial to its position in this arbitration.
Consequently though the Company has proved the elements
of its factual case, it has failed to establish a contractual
basis for the exclusion of the Dispatcher job from the bargaining unit.

As the duties of the Dispatcher are not cleri-

cal (office) within what I have deemed to be the meaning of
Article I (Recognition) of the contract, the job of Dispatcher
does not qualify as an exclusion thereunder.
Based on the foregoing I render the following AWARD:
The job of Dispatcher shall be placed within the
bargaining unit and shall be filled in accordance
with the terms of the collective bargaining agreement.

T Schmertz
Arbitrator
DATED: March
1969
STATE OF New York
COUNTY OF New York

)gg .
) ""

On this
day of March, 1969, before me personally came
and appeared Eric J. Schmertz to me known and known to me to
be the individual described in and who executed the foregoing
instrument and he acknowledged to me that he executed the same,

In the Matter of the Arbitration
between
Ford Instrument Division
Sperry Rand Corporation
and
International Union of Electrical,
Radio & Machine Workers, AFL-CIO
Local 471 and Local 425, IUE.

Award
and
Opinion

This is a consolidated proceeding between Ford Instrument
Division, Sperry Rand Corporation, hereinafter referred to as
the "Company," and Locals 471 and 425 of the International
Union of Electrical, Radio and Machine Workers, AFL-CIO, hereinafter referred to jointly as the "Unions," involving a dispute arising out of the events of May 26, 1969.
In accordance with the appropriate arbitration provisions
of the Collective Bargaining Agreements between the Company and
the Unions, the Undersigned was designated as the Arbitrator.
A hearing was held at the offices of the New York State
Board of Mediation on July 31, 1969 at which time representatives of the Company and the Unions, hereinafter referred to
collectively as the "parties," appeared, and were afforded
full opportunity to offer evidence and argument and to examine
and cross examine witnesses.

The parties expressly waived the

Arbitrator's oath and post hearings were filed.
The parties did not agree upon a precisely worded issue.
Based on the record I deem the questions for determination to
be:
Were the activities of the Unions (and the participating employees) on May 26, 1969 violative of the con-

- 2 tractual "no strike" clauses? If so should the
Unions be enjoined prospectively from repeating
those or similar activities?
The pertinent parts of the contractual "no strike"
clauses in the two Collective Bargaining Agreements involved
(respectively Local 471 and Local 425) read:
Article XII
During the terms of this Agreement, the Union agrees
that there shall be no strikes, sit-downs, walkouts,
slow-downs or any other cessation of work by the
Union or by its individual members.
Section 22
The Union will not cause or permit its members to
cause nor will any member of the Union take part
in any sit-down or stay-in strikes, or sympathetic
strike, or any other strike or stoppage, so long
as the Employer complies with the terms of this
Agreement.
There is no basic dispute over the meaning of these
clauses.

With the proviso "so long as the Employer complies

with the terms of this Agreement" in the Local 425 contractual clause (a circumstance not alleged by that Union and
hence not material in the instant case) the Unions and their
members may not engage in any of the activities explicitly
proscribed in those "no strike" clauses.

Therefore it fol-

lows that any such action or activity by the Unions or
their members, now, and during the life of the Collective
Agreements, would be improper and are prohibited.
As the Collective Bargaining Agreements are matters of
evidence before me in this proceeding, I have no hesitancy
about making this interpretation and application of the "no
strike" clauses of the contracts as an Award in this case.
In my judgment that is the extent of my authority regarding

- 3 possible future, and therefore speculative, violations of
Article XII and Section 22 of the respective Collective
Agreements.
As the parties well know, the "no lock-out" and "no
strike" provisions of Article XII and Section 22 are reciprocal protective devices.

The former protects the employees

from unwarranted disruption of their employment opportunity;
and the latter protects the Company from interference with
its normal work during the life of the contract.

Disputes

which might otherwise lead to either type of action are resolved instead only in the forum of the grievance procedure
and arbitration.
Manifestly then, any waiver of, exception to or variation from the prohibitions against strikes or lock-outs
(except for the previously mentioned proviso in the Local
425 contract) require the express consent or participation
of the protected party.

Therefore in the case of the "no

strike" clause, any change or exception must be agreed to
by the Company.

And because the "no strike" clause (togeth-

er with the reciprocal promise of "no lock-out") is traditionally viewed as a key element in the maintenance of industrial peace during the term of the contract, exceptions,
variations or waivers must be limited to the specific and
precise terms laid down, agreed to or accepted by the Company,
In short, exceptions to the "no strike" clause may not go
beyond those explicit steps which the Employer allows the
Union or its members to take.
I find that in the instant case the Company did consent

_ 4 to allow the Unions to engage in certain activities which,
if engaged in without that consent might well be violative
of the "no strike" clauses of the contracts.

But on May 26,

1969 the Unions went materially beyond the bounds of that
arrangement, and in so doing, whether unwittingly or not,
encroached on the Company's right to protection under the
"no strike" clauses.
Prior to May 26, 1969, the Company agreed to the following specific exception to the proscriptions of Article XII
and Section 22.

On a day by day basis, with prior notice

to the Company, the Company released about five employee/
members of each local Union whom the Company and the Unions
agreed were less needed for work in the plant that day.
Those employees then participated in demonstrations (in the
form of picketing) led by the Unions, in front of the Sperry
Rand corporate offices, in Manhattan, in opposition to the
Corporation's announced plan to phase out and close down its
operations.

This arrangement embodied prior notice by the

Union to the Company; prior agreement for each day involved
on the employees to be released; and a release of about ten
such employees on each occasion.

It is these details,

rather than the wisdom of the arrangements that are germane
to this case.

For whether or not the Company acted wisely

in cooperating with the Union in the latter's planned picketing of the corporate offices the details of the arrangements nonetheless constituted agreed upon exceptions to the
"no strike" clauses.
But the activity of the Unions and certain of its mem-

- 5 bers on May 26, 1969 went well beyond the scope of what the
Company agreed to permit.

It may well be that the Unions

honestly viewed their activity that day as founded on the
Company's prior authorization.

If so the Unions erred.

For

on May 26, 1969 the Unions picketed the corporate offices
in Manhattan without prior notice to the Company.

The par-

ticipating employees, although including many who had been
released by the Company on prior occasions, were not released
by the Company on or for May 26.

And instead of involving

about ten employees, 65 participated, and were away from
their work duties for about 2-1/2 hours.

In those significant

respects the Unions went beyond the previously agreed upon
exception to the "no strike" clauses.

And because actual

loss of production is not a necessary condition precedent to
a breach of the "no strike" clause, whether or not production was lost during that period of time is immaterial.
As I have indicated, the Union may have concluded logically, that because the Company previously authorized similar types of demonstrations on a smaller scale under different conditions, it would not object to the events of May 26.
But with this proceeding the Union is now on notice that the
use of employees during their regular working hours to picket in front of corporate headquarters in Manhattan must conform to the detailed conditions under which the Company
agrees to permit such activity as an exception to the prohibitions of Article XII and Section 22 of the contracts.
If the conditions of that or any other exception are not followed precisely, as they were not on May 26, the activity of

- 6 the Unions would enjoy no immunity from the "no strike"
clauses of the contracts and indeed would be violative of
those clauses.
Accordingly the Unions are on notice that a repetition
of such unauthorized activity would be improper.

It would

not only be violative of Article XII of the Local 471 contract and Section 22 of the Local 425 Contract (again with
the proviso "so long as the Employer complies with the terms
of this Agreement") but also would be in violation of this
Award.
Eric Y* Schmertz
Arbitrator

DATED: September^ 1969
STATE OF New York
)
/ss. :
COUNTY OF New York
)
On this C** day of September, 1969, before me personally
came and appeared Eric J. Schmertz to me known and known to
me to be the individual described in and who executed the
foregoing instrument and he acknowledged to me that he executed the same.

Notary Pu >, .-. ~\~.".

NEW YORK STATE BOARD OF MEDIATION, ADMINISTRATOR

In the Matter of the Arbitration between
International Chemical Workers
Union Local 277

and

Award

GAF Corproation

In accordance with the Arbitration provisions of the
Collective Bargaining Agreement between GAF Corporation,
hereinafter referred to as the "Company," and International
Chemical Workers Union Local 227, hereinafter referred to
as the "Union," the Undersigned was designated as the
Arbitrator to hear and decide a dispute involving the grievance #5-68 dated July 17, 1968.
A hearing was held at the offices of the New York State
Board of Mediation in Albany, New York on January 7, 1969,
at which time Mr. George Sedgewick, hereinafter referred to
as the "grievant," and representatives of the Union and Company, hereinafter referred to jointly as the "parties,"
appeared.

The parties expressly waived the Arbitrator's

oath and the tri-partite Board of Arbitration,agreeing instead,
to submit the dispute to the Undersigned as sole Arbitrator,
During the course of the hearing the parties reached a
settlement of the dispute which was explained to the grievant
and which he accepted,,

He signed an acknowledgment of his

acceptance, under a written statement of the settlement, in
the notes of the Undersigned.

At the request of the parties

and the grievant, the settlement is made a CONSENT AWARD as
follows:

- 2 The positions of the parties regarding the merits
of the case are preserved. The Company reiterates
that the discharge was proper under the circumstances of the case. The Union takes the position
that while some discipline was warranted, the penalty of discharge was too severe. Without prejudice to the respective positions of both sides,
and without creating any precedent whatsoever for
any subsequent case, the grievance of George
Sedgewick, grievance #5-68, is settled on the
following basis:
1. Sedgewick1s retirement from the Company's
employ shall be effective July 1, 1968.
2. His retirement, for pension and other benefits, shall be deemed as voluntary (as an
active employee) as of that date, and all
benefits of a voluntary retirement shall be
accorded Sedgewick.

Eric J. Schmertz
Arbitrator

DATED: January
1969
STATE OF New York
)ss. :
COUNTY OF New York
)
On this
day of January, 196*9, before me personally
came and appeared Eric J. Schmertz to me known and known to
me to be the individual described in and who executed the
foregoing instrument and he acknowledged to me that he executed the same.

Case #AA68-92

®fa ^U^~^J7 j^
//^L^J^^
i' /
fr=>

"
'

!X#£Z5

s

AMERICAN ARBITRATION ASSOCIATION, ADMINISTRATOR

Voluntary Labor Arbitration

Tribunal

In the Matter of the arbitration
between
Local 761, International Union of Electric,
Radio and Machine Workers, AFL-CIO
Award

and
General Electric Company
Louisville, Kentucky

The Undersigned Arbitrator, having been designated in
accordance with the Arbitration Agreement entered into by the
above-named Parties, and dated 1966-1969 and having duly
heard the proofs and allegations of the Parties, Awards as
follows:
The warning and four week disciplinary suspension
imposed by the Company on George D. Stapleton was
for just cause and is upheld.

Eric J. Schmertz
Arbitrator

DATED: July

1969

STATE OF New York
COUNTY OF New York

)ss.:
)

On this
day of July, 1969, before me personally came
and appeared Eric J. Schmertz to me known and known to me to
be the individual described in and who executed the foregoing
instrument and he acknowledged to me that he executed the same,
Case No. 52 30 0273-68

In the Matter of the Arbitration
between

"
'
i

Local 761, International Union of Electric, '
Radio and Machine Workers, AFL-CIO
'
i
and
'
i
General Electric Company
Louisville, Kentucky

Opinion

'
!

In accordance with Article XV of the Collective Bargaining Agreement dated 1966-1969 between General Electric Company, Louisville, Kentucky, hereinafter referred to as the
"Company," and Local 761, International Union of Electric,
Radio and Machine Workers, AFL-CIO, hereinafter referred to
as the "Union," the Undersigned was designated as the Arbitrator to hear and decide a dispute involving the propriety of a
warning and four week disciplinary suspension imposed on
George T. Stapleton, hereinafter referred to as the "grievant."
Hearings were held in Louisville, Kentucky on March 18
and 19, 1969, at which time the grievant and representatives
of the Union and Company, hereinafter referred to jointly as
the "parties," appeared and were afforded full opportunity to
offer evidence and argument and to examine and cross examine
witnesses.

The parties expressly waived the Arbitrator's oath,

and filed post hearing briefs.
The factual events that are relevant to this case arose
out of the most recent election campaign for local Union
officers.

The particular events which resulted in the dis-

ciplinary action against the grievant occurred on the evening
of March 8, 1968.

The grievant was a candidate for Local

- 2 Union President.

On that evening, during regular working hours,

but outside of his regularly scheduled shift and without authorization, he entered the factory area of the Consumer Refrigerator Department for the conceded purpose of canvassing and soliciting votes amongst the employees then at work.
There is no serious quarrel with the fact that in so doing he violated a Company regulation which prohibited electioneering and distribution of literature within the plant during
working hours (a regulation which the Company expressly reiterated to each of the candidates, including the grievant shortly
before the election campaign began.)

The grievant was not dis-

ciplined for this act, but rather for what the Company contends
transpired thereafter.
The Company claims that soon after the grievant was observed
in the factory area he was instructed by the Unit Manager to
leave the building but refused to do so, stating that the Unit
Manager had better "call plant protection," if he really wanted
him to leave.

When a Company guard was called, the grievant to-

gether with another accompanying employee again refused to leave,
stating that the Company would "have to call more guards."

Dur-

ing the time that followed, in which the guard sought additional
assistance, the grievant and his companion moved to the rear of
the building and disappeared.

Later that evening, the Company

asserts, the grievant reappeared in the same factory working
area.
In addition to the foregoing, the Company charges that the
grievant committed a further act of misconduct and insubordina'tion by directing profane, abusive and threatening language and

- 3 statements to the Unit Manager when first asked to leave the
premises.
In short, the Company deems the grievant's action on the
evening of March 8, 1968, in the course of his confrontation
with Company representatives, as constituting separately and
cumulatively, "gross insubordination and gross misconduct,"
for which the disciplinary warning and suspension were justified.
The main thrust of the Union's case is that the grievant
was singled out for a more severe penalty than ever before
imposed under similar circumstances; and that because the
Company failed to apply that discipline in a consistent and
even handed manner, the grievant's penalty was discriminatory.
Specifically the Union claims that during the election campaigns candidates for local Union officers have regularly entered factory areas during working hours and greeted, talked
with and solicited votes among the employees, without objection
from supervision.

In other words, the Company's policy against

that type of electioneering was honored in the breach; and
foremen and Unit Managers (some of whom had once been bargaining unit employees) were sympathetic to the needs of the candidates to "get around the plant" and "looked the other way."
The Union cited circumstances in which other candidates who
electioneered in factory areas without authorization were not
disciplined, though some failed to leave the plant when told
to do so.
In addition, the grievant and the Union on his behalf,
dispute the Company's version of the critical facts.

The use

- 4 of profane, abusive and threatening language by the grievant to
the Unit Manager is denied in its entirety.

Also denied is the

Company's claim that the grievant flatly refused to leave the
building.

Rather, it is asserted that the grievant merely

stated that he "would not disrupt production and would leave
the building shortly."
Regarding the confrontation between the grievant on the
one hand and the Unit Manager and guard on the other, it is the
Union's position that any abrasive aspects thereof were merely
part of a "show," put on by the grievant to structure an adversary posture vis a vis management which he thought would gain
him votes among the employees.

Or in other words, any defiance

of or disrespect to the managerial representatives was more
form than substance.

And finally the Union argues that if there

is to be any penalty at all, the Company may not exceed a suspension of one week because of the contractual provisions of
Article XII Section 3 and a past practice of imposing no more
than that penalty for a first offense of insubordination.
Certain industrial relation principles are so well settled
by a long line of arbitration cases, that they need only be
enunciated here, and require no explanation.

An employee's re-

fusal to carry out the reasonable instructions and directives
of supervision constitutes an improper defiance of supervisory
authority.

Also, unless justifiably provoked, the use of pro-

fane, abusive, disrespectful or threatening language by an employee to his superior, is equally impermissable.
classical examples of insubordination.

Both are

Insubordination of that

type, is grounds for severe discipline up to and including dis-

- 5 charge.

But such penalty will not be upheld unless it has

been consistently and evenly applied to all employees who
have committed that offense under similar circumstances.
As a discipline case and with the burden on the Company
to establish its charges by clear and convincing evidence, the
question therefore is whether the facts in the instant dispute,
as applied to these well settled principles, support the Company's action.

I conclude that they do.

The Union's assertion that the grievant did not use abusive
and profane language to the Unit Manager and did not defiantly
refuse to leave the factory when instructed to do so, is just
not consistent with its concession that the grievant was putting
on a "show" for the purpose of gaining votes.

Indeed unless a

sharp adversary situation was created between the grievant and
supervision, the basic ingredient for a "show" from which the
grievant could expect to gain the votes of militant members,
would be missing.

And without defiance or words challenging

supervisory authority, an adversary climate would not emerge.
For that reason, together with the unshaken testimony of the
Unit Manager and the guard, I must conclude that the grievant
did refuse, and persisted in his refusal to leave the building
when twice instructed to do so.

And I am satisfied that he

made his refusal expressly known to the Unit Manager and the
guard in the open presence of fellow employees.

For the same

reason I must conclude that the statements testified to by the
Company witnesses, in which they said the grievant used abusive
and profane expressions to the Unit Manager, are an accurate
reflection of what in fact took place.

Even if the grievant1s

- 6 intent was to put on a "show," and hence did not really mean
what he was saying, I am unable to excuse him.

First of all

in no other situation, involving no other candidate who solicited votes in the factory area during working hours, was there a
dialogue of this type between a candidate and a supervisory
employee.

In not a single other situation, at least so far as

this record is concerned, was there a comparable exchange between the candidate and a Unit Manager in which the former
used profane, disrespectful, abusive and threatening language.
So in that respect the instant situation is significantly
different from other campaign activities by other candidates.
But even more significant to my mind is the obvious fact that
despite the grievant's private reservations about what he meant,
his outward intent was to embarrass if not hold up to ridicule,
this particular Unit Manager, in the eyes of the employees under the Manager's supervision.

So, though it may have been an

"act"by the grievant, it is undisputed that neither the Unit
Manager nor the guard were privy to, agreed to, or acquiesced
in it.

I find no reason why they should not have taken the

situation seriously.

And if the outward intent was designed

or served to undermine the authority of the Unit Manager or
stimulate disrespect for him among employees under his supervision, its inconsistency with the normal relationship between
superior and employee and hence its impropriety is manifest.
In short, in order to gain election votes the grievant took
the calculated risk of creating an abrasive confrontation with
supervision.

By doing so in a manner much sharper and signifi-

- 7 cantly different from the acts of other candidates at other
times, he must or should have known that that risk included
the possibility that the Company would respond with discipline.
And having assumed the risk, without the willing participation
or acquiescence of the Company, he may not now avoid the responsibility.
On a different but closely related ground, the grievant's
conduct was

materially different from those prior examples

which the Union claims are similar.

There is no dispute that

other candidates entered factory areas contrary to the Company
policy.

But the evidence indicates that each time they were

instructed to leave they did so promptly and without any single
refusal, or they acted in such a way as to lead the Company to
believe that they had or would leave the premises.
not the case with the grievant.

Such was

He openly refused to leave

and defiantly persisted in that refusal when plant protection
was called.

Therefore whether he ultimately left the plant is

immaterial.

Also as distinguished from other incidents, there

is unrefuted evidence in the record that the grievant returned
to that factory area the very same evening; which can be construed in no way other than a knowing disregard of the instructions he received earlier.

In any event, no prior example ad-

vanced by the Union involved that latter circumstance.

So I

cannot accept the Union's argument that the lesser penalties
(or the absence of penalty) which attached to certain prior
examples of electioneering, are applicable to the facts in the
instant case.

As the facts are markedly different, the penalty

- need not therefore be the same.

- 8 The Union's contractual argument that the penalty must be
limited to no more than one week's suspension under Article XIII
Section 3 of the contract, is just not supported by the language
of that Section.

What is set forth therein is the requirement

that the Company provide an employee with one week's notice before imposing a disciplinary penalty "which is based upon the
cumulative effect of written warning notices."

To my mind

that language applies to the "progressive discipline" type of
infraction.

It means that where the Company intends to impose

a more severe disciplinary penalty not solely because of a
single infraction, but based on a last violation together with
prior infractions for which warning notices were given, the
one week notice is required.

But by its very language, Section

3 is limited to disciplinary penalties based on those cumulative warning notices.

And therefore, other types of disciplin-

ary penalties, namely those imposed for a new or single violation, and not based on the employee's prior disciplinary record,
are excluded.

The test in that event, in my view, is simply

whether the Company's disciplinary action was for just cause,
and Section 3 is inapplicable.
On the amount of penalty the Union takes the position that
the Company is bound by past practice; that for a first offense
of insubordination, the Company has consistently imposed, and
therefore is bound by a penalty of no more than a one week
disciplinary suspension.
only in part.

The Company concedes this practice

It asserts that it has divided insubordination

into two types - "simple insubordination and gross insubordination."

That a one week disciplinary penalty applies to the

- 9 former, but the latter is subject to greater discipline including discharge.

Though the record before me is quite sparse

in providing examples of "simple insubordination," there is
enough at least to persuade me that a distinction between two
types of insubordination has been made.

In 1966 an employee

named Mallory was suspended for a month for the "gross insubordinate" act of refusing to carry out a work order, and in
1967 an employee named Downs was discharged for "gross insubordination."

There was no Union challenge to the Company"s

assertion that in both cases the insubordination was the first
committed by those employees.

So while there may have been in-

stances where only a one week suspension was imposed, it cannot be interpreted as a consistent and unvaried practice within the definition of a "past practice."

Therefore, in the ab-

sence of a contract provision on the measure of penalty for
any particular type of offense, (and there is no such provision in the contract between the parties here,) the general
rules regarding insubordination must obtain.
Applying the general rule, I find it unnecessary to decide whether the grievant's conduct in this case was "simple
insubordination" or "gross insubordination."
nature was severe and overt.

Its substantive

And within the frame of the well

settled rule for that type of insubordination severe disciplinary penalties up to and including discharge are proper, even
for the first offense.
Accordingly I find no basis to fault the Company's decision to impose a disciplinary suspension of/four weeks.

Eric/T. Schmertz
Arbitrator

,.

AMERICAN ARBITRATION ASSOCIATION, ADMINISTRATOR
Voluntary Labor Arbitration Tribunal

In the Matter of the Arbitration
between
Local 282 IBT

and

Award

Harris Structural Steel Company

The Undersigned Arbitrator, having been designated in
accordance with the Arbitration Agreement entered into by the
above-named Parties, and having been duly sworn and having
duly heard the proofs and allegations of the Parties, Awards
as follows:
The discharge of Carmelo Ventre was not for just
cause. It is reduced to a disciplinary suspension.
He shall be reinstated without back pay. The period of time between his discharge and his reinstatement shall be deemed a disciplinary suspension.

Eric 5. Schtnertz
Arbitrator

DATED: December / 1969
STATE OF New York
)Ss.•
COUNTY OF New York
)
On this / day of December, 1969, before me personally
came and appeared Eric J. Schmertz to me known and known to me
to be the individual described in and who executed the foregoing instrument and he acknowledged to me that he executed
the same.
Case No. 1330 0838 69

In the Matter of the Arbitration
between
Local 282 IBT

and

Opinion

Harris Structural Steel Company

The stipulated issue is:
Was there just cause for the discharge of
Carmelo Ventre? If not, what shall be the
remedy?
A hearing was held at the American Arbitration Association on November 18, 1969 at which time Mr. Ventre, hereinafter referred to as the "grievant," and representatives of
the above named Union and Company, hereinafter referred to
jointly as the "parties," appeared, and were afforded full
opportunity to offer evidence and argument and to examine
and cross examine witnesses.
The Company charges the grievant with absenteeism and
an insubordinate outburst.

These charges are the reasons

for the discharge.
I do not find the grievant blameless, but I find the
penalty of discharge to be too severe.
The grievant's attendance record is not one of chronic
absenteeism.

Absences upon which the Company relies occurr-

ed during the two weeks preceding his discharge.

But those

absences are well explained and appear not to be of a recurring nature.

He was absent the entire week from August

26 to September 2 because of the illness of his wife, during

- 2 which time he was forced to care for his four children.

He

was again absent on Wednesday of the following week, September 3, apparently for the same reason.

There is no evidence

in the record which contradicts his testimony concerning his
wife's illness and hospitalization.

Also, though the Company

asserts that during one of these two periods, he did not call
in to advise he would be absent, it is not clear to which period the Company refers.

And the grievant testified directly

that he did notify the Company Time Keeper.

The Company con-

cedes that the grievant "usually does call in" and has been
"pretty good" about notifying the Company when he is absent.
Consequently I think there is a presumption in favor of his
statement that he also called in prior to or during these two
last periods of absence.

So I am unable to attach as much

seriousness to the grievant's absences as does the Company,
particularly in view of his undisputed explanation and the
fact that his absentee record is not, at least at this point,
chronically excessive.
There is no doubt that the grievant lost his temper and
used both disrespectful language and a disrespectful tone in
his meeting with the Plant Superintendent on September 9.
That meeting was called by the latter in response to the
grievant's request for a leave of absence necessitated by his
wife's illness, hospitalization and recuperation.
The grievant's outburst is not to be excused, but as an
excitable man, he erroneously perceived a legitimate inquiry
by the Company regarding the name of the hospital in which
his wife was a patient, as an invasion of his private life.

- 3 I am persuaded that this angered him beyond a reasonable point,
primarily because of his concern over his wife's health and
the attendant disruption of his normal family life.

That he

should not have become so disturbed is obvious now, not only
to an objective observer, but also to the grievant.

He stat-

ed quite candidly at the hearing that he should not have become so excited; should not have argued disrespectfully with
the Superintendent; though he still believes that the inquiry
concerning the whereabouts of the hospital in which his wife
was located, was not proper.

As to the latter, he is wrong.

But his intemperate outburst must be viewed in the context of
the particular pressures on him at that time.

As such it is

just not enough to constitute the kind of insubordination for
which the ultimate penalty of discharge is justified.
On the other hand some penalty is in order so as to put
him on notice that he must hereafter control his temper not
only in future dealings with Company representatives, but also
with his fellow employees; and also as notice that while his
present absentee record is not yet at an excessive point, an
improvement is necessary to prevent it from reaching that point.
Accordingly the penalty of discharge is reduced to a disciplinary suspension.

The Company shall reinstate him without back

pay and the period of time from his discharge to his reinstatement shall be deemed a disciplinary

suspension.

&LA*J4***+**I*£^

Eric 6. Schmertz /
Arbitrator

Federal Mediation and Conciliation Service, Administrator

In the Matter of the Arbitration
between
District 15 I.A.M.A.W.
AWARD
Case No. 69A/7268

-andHertz Corporation

The Undersigned Arbitrator, having duly heard the
proofs and allegations of the above named parties, makes
the following AWARD:

The discharge of Edward Schippan is upheld.
The discharge of Vito DiTuri is reversed. He
shall be reinstated with back pay, less his
earnings, if any, during the period since his
discharge.

Eric J. Schmertz
Arbitrator
Acknowledgement:
DATED: July
1969
STATE OF New York
COUNTY OF New York

)ss:
)

On this
day of July, 1969, before me personally came
and appeared Eric J. Schmertz to me known and known to me
to be the individual described in and who executed the
foregoing instrument and he acknowledged to me that he
executed same0

AMERICAN ARBITRATION ASSOCIATION, ADMINISTRATOR
Voluntary Labor Arbitration Tribunal

In the Matter of the Arbitration
between
Local 584, IBT

and

Award

Hertz Corporation

The Undersigned Arbitrator, having been designated in
accordance with the Arbitration Agreement entered into by the
above named Parties, and having duly heard the proofs and
allegations of the Parties, Awards as follows:
The discharge of Michael Randazzo is reduced to
a suspension. He shall be reinstated but without back pay. The period between his discharge
and his reinstatement shall be deemed a disciplinare suspension and so noted in his employment
record. As explained in the attached Opinion,
the grievant has the option of reinstatement
either to his former position as a Utilityman or
to an apprentice job in the Company's machine
shop at the same rate of pay0

EricO. Schmertz
Arbitrator

DATED: November / 2.1969
STATE OF New York
)
COUNTY OF New York
) ''
On this t\. day of November, 1969, before me personally
came and appeared Eric J. Schmertz to me known and known to
me to be the individual described in and who executed the foregoing instrument and he acknowledged to me that he executed
the same0
Case # 1330 0831 69

In the Matter of the Arbitration
between
Local 584, IBT

and

Opinion

Hertz Corporation

In accordance with the Arbitration provisions of the
Collective Bargaining Agreement between Hertz Corporation,
hereinafter referred to as the "Company," and Local 584, IBT,
hereinafter referred to as the "Union," the Undersigned was
designated as the Arbitrator to hear and decide a dispute
involving the discharge of Michael Randazzo.
A hearing was held at the offices of the American Arbitration Association on November 6, 1969 at which time Mr.
Randazzo, hereinafter referred to as the "grievant," and representatives of the Union and Company, hereinafter referred
to jointly as the "parties," appeared, and were afforded
full opportunity to offer evidence and argument and to examine
and cross examine witnesses.

The parties expressly waived

the Arbitrator's oath.
The grievant, a Utilityman, was discharged by the Company following three accidents, the first two of which caused
damage to Company trucks and the third, injury to himself.
The Company blames the grievant for all three„
As a discharge case, the well settled burden is on the
Company to prove the grievant's wrongdoing by clear and convincing evidence, and to establish that the penalty was justified.

I see no reason why this burden and the standard of

- 2 proof required should be different in this case than in any
other.
Under this test the Company's case is vulnerable because
it relies essentially on allegations rather than direct evidence.

This is not to say that what the Company alleges may

not be true, but rather that it has not met its burden of
proving the charges up to the standards required.
There is no dispute that the grievant was involved in
at least three accidents.

What is unproved is the Company's

contention that all three were due to his carelessness.

The

Company submitted into evidence copies of the reports of the
vehicular accidents of November 29 and December 11, 1968.
Those reports, in and of themselves, do not establish the
grievant's negligence,though they do indicate the extent of
the damage.

The Company offered no testimony or other evi-

dence concerning how the accidents occurred or showing the
grievant's responsibility for the accidents.

Rather, the

Company spokesman merely stated that as a result of an investigation by the Company and its underwriter, the grievant "was
found at fault."

But this is only a conclusion, not evidence.

There is also testimony of a subsequent accident (not included among the specific three for which the grievant was fired)
in which it was alleged that the grievant "side swiped"
another truck.

Yet again it was advanced not by a person who

saw the alleged accident; nor even by someone who investigated it; but rather by one who merely heard of it.

And absent

other direct corroborating evidence, that kind of testimony

- 3 is not enough to impute liability or fault to the grievant0
The evidence in connection with the third accident is
somewhat different.

The grievant concedes that he was smok-

ing a cigarette in a no-smoking area near gasoline tanks; that
a flash fire developed, igniting his trousers and burning his
leg, for which he was subsequently hospitalized.

There is no

doubt that this accident, serious as it was, was potentially
much more serious, by endangering the Company's installation
and the other employees.

Clearly, the grievant's disregard

of the no-smoking prohibition was a careless act, warranting
punishment.

But for two reasons I must conclude that the pen-

alty of discharge is too severe.
First, as the Company has not proved the grievant1s culpability with regard to the two prior vehicular accidents,
those instances, upon which the Company relies in part, to
support its decision to fire him, are not persuasive evidence
of misconduct.

And second, the Company did not refute the

grievant's testimony that many other employees, including
supervisory employees, smoke cigarettes in no-smoking areas,
with impunity.

In other words if there is a "no smoking"

rule, not only should it be posted, as it is, but it must be
enforced consistently and uniformly.
For all these reasons the grievant's discharge is reduced to a suspension.

He shall be reinstated without back

pay and the period of time between his discharge and his reinstatement shall be deemed a disciplinary suspension.

But

he should be aware of the fact that his discharge is not up-

- 4held in this proceeding, not because I find him to be blameless for the accidents, but because the Company has not proved
his culpability to the extent necessary, when it has the burden to do so.
Therefore the grievant is on notice that any further
accidents, careless or negligent handling of equipment, violations of Company rules or any other misconduct, could constitute grounds for summary dismissal„
Also I wish to direct a suggestion to the grievant, because I perceive a basic incompatibility between him and his
job as a Utilityman.

Obviously, a directive separating him

from that particular job is not within my authority0

But I

can and shall advance the idea as a piece of advice.

I think

it quite probable that if the grievant returns to his job as
a Utilityman, as he has the right to do under this Award, he
will soon find himself involved in new difficulties attendant
to the driving and handling of the vehicles involved.

And he

may find himself discharged, for cause, without reinstatement
rights; and hence without a job.
In the alternative I suggest that he give full and careful consideration to accepting a different job with the
Company} specifically in the Company's machine shop, where
he would learn a trade and be paid at a rate no less than
what he would earn as a Utilityman.

I believe his personal-

ity is better suited to work in the machine shop and that
his future would be better protected if not enhanced by his
acceptance of that assignment.

The choice is with the griev-

- 5ant.

If he wants to return to his job as Utilityman, in

accordance with my Award, he may do so.

But I hope that upon

reflection he will decide otherwise and choose the machine
shop.

If so the Company is directed to place him in the mach-

ine shop in an apprentice position at a rate of pay no less
than what he would receive as a Utilityman.

I solicit the

Union's support for this recommendation and ask that it use
its good offices to persuade the grievant to follow my
suggestion„

Eric/j. Schmertz
Arbitrator

AMERICAN ARBITRATION ASSOCIATION,

ADMINISTRATOR

Voluntary Labor Arbitration Tribunal

In the matter of the Arbitration
between
United Papermakers and Paper-workers
Local 800 AFL-CIO
Award

and
Johns-Manville Products Corporation

The Undersigned Arbitrator, having been designated in
accordance with the Arbitration Agreement entered into by the
above-named Parties, and dated August 16, 1968 and having
duly heard the proofs and allegations of the Parties, Awards
as follows:
The discharge of Raymond Regiec was for
just cause.

Eric >5. Schmertz
Arbitrator

DATED: March 2-? 1969
STATE OF New York
COUNTY OF New York

ss. :
)

On this
1 day of March, 1969, before me personally came
and appeared Eric J. Schmertz to me known and known to me to
be the individual described in and who executed the foregoing
instrument and he acknowledged to me that he executed the same.

Case No. 1330 0594 68

In the Matter of the Arbitration
between
United Papertnakers and Paperworkers
Local 800 AFL-CIO
and

Opinion

Johns-Manville Products Corporation

In accordance with Article XI of the Collective Bargaining Agreement dated August 16, 1968 between Johns-Manville
Products Corporation, hereinafter referred to as the "Company,"
and United Paper-makers and Paperworkers Local 800, AFL-CIO,
hereinafter referred to as the "Union," the Undersigned was
designated as the Arbitrator to hear and decide the following
stipulated issue:
Was there just cause for the discharge of Raymond
Regiec? If not, what shall be the remedy?
Hearings were held at the Company office in Manville,
New Jersey on March 17, 1969 at which time Mr. Regiec, hereinafter referred to as the "grievant," and representatives of
the Union and Company, hereinafter referred to jointly as the
"parties," appeared.

Full opportunity was afforded all con-

cerned to offer evidence and argument and to examine and cross
examine witnesses.

The parties expressly waived the Arbitra-

tor' s oath.
The Company asserts that the grievant was discharged for
insubordination; specifically using foul and abusive language
to his supervisor, plus a prior disciplinary record which included several verbal and written warnings for various offenses,
The parties are in sharp disagreement over the precise

- 2 language which the grievant used; whether it was "shop talk"
or personalized; and whether it was seriously intended or in
jest.

Also the Union contends that the issue turns solely on

I
the alleged insubordination, because that was the reason set
forth in the Company's notice of the grievant's discharge, and
that the grievant's prior disciplinary record is not applicable.
It is well settled that the use of foul, abusive or contemptuous language by an employee, directed or personalized
towards a superior within the employment relationship, constitutes insubordination.

And it is equally well settled that

a severe disciplinary penalty including the ultimate penalty
of discharge is proper for any such offense, irrespective of
the employee's prior employment history.

Therefore the Com-

pany's action in discharging the grievant stands or falls on
the charge of insubordination.

If that charge is proved, the

discharge must be upheld, and the grievant's prior disciplinary record is immaterial.

If not, the Company would have

failed to establish just cause for the discharge action.
There is no dispute that two incidents involving the use
of some sort of objectionable language by the grievant took
place between him and his foreman, Mr. Foland, during the
third shift on June 22, 1968.

For several reasons I find the

foreman's testimony concerning the language used by the grievant more credible than the grievant's version.

The grievant

admitted during the course of his testimony that two exchanges
occurred that evening, although during the processing of his
grievance in the grievance procedure, he persistently denied
the occurrence of the second incident.

Moreover, he admitted

- 3 that he apologized to the foreman on both occasions, when the
foreman objected to the nature and tone of the language used.
Comparing the grievant's testimony concerning the language he used, with that of the foreman, I find every reason
why the grievant should apologize if the language was of the
nature and type alleged by the foreman. But if it was as temperate as the grievant claims, I very much doubt that the foreman would have demanded an apology, nor do I think an apology
on both occasions would have been normally warranted.

There-

fore, by the grievant's own conduct, first in denying and
then admitting the occurrence of a second incident; and by
his apologies on both occasions, I must conclude that the
language he used was as recited by the foreman's testimony.
And without repeating it herein, that language was manifestly
profane and obscene.
I cannot accept the Union's contention that it was simply "shop talk."

That phrase means the use of profane or un-

social language in the course of general conversation between
or amongst employees in a factory or even between employees
and supervision.

But where that language becomes personalized;

where it is directed by an employee to his superior as an individual, and where it is hurled in an abusive contemptuous
or defiant manner, it becomes insubordination.

Here I am

persuaded, the latter test has been met.

To accept the fore-

man's version supports such a conclusion.

Also the grievant

admitted that he thought the foreman was "on his back"
throughout the shift, and that he resented it.

I consider

it doubtful in the extreme that if the grievant was of that

- 4adversary view, and irritated as a result, his remarks on the
second occasion would have been either non-personalized or in
jest.

Logic compels a different analysis - namely that the

language was used in anger and was directed, on a personal
basis, to the foreman.
On similar grounds I must reject the Union's contention
that the exchange between the grievant and the foreman was
merely "kidding around" or within an atmosphere of jest. This
may have been true the first time it happened that evening.
For there is some indication that on prior days, the foreman
and his employees engaged in humorous banter which may have
included "shop talk" language.

But even if the grievant is

given this benefit of the doubt, I find no way to apply it to
the second incident nor can I therefore justify the grievant's
conduct on that second occasion.

When it happened the first

time the foreman made it crystal clear that he objected to
the language and considered it a personal attack.

Indeed, as

an indication of his unequivocal objection he then fired the
grievant, and revoked the discharge only when the grievant
apologized.

So, if the grievant meant his words playfully I

think of no set of circumstances which would have more forcefully disabused him of that notion thereafter.

In short, he

was placed on notice that a repetition of that type of language
and the manner in which it was used was not to recur, and that
his discharge was expressly revoked on that condition.
Therefore I think it both implausible and unsupported by
the evidence to conclude that the second incident was either
in jest or based on a misunderstanding by the grievant of the

- 5 foreman's attitude.

Rather I see no alternative but to con-

clude that the grievant on the second occasion, wilfully
directed foul and abusive language at the foreman, on a personal and contemptuous basis.

Hence if the first incident

did not meet the test of insubordination, the second most certainly did.

And the second time it was not forgiven, nor

need it have been^despite the grievant1s preferred apology.

Eric Jr. Schmertz
Arbitrator

AMERICAN ARBITRATION ASSOCIATION, ADMINISTRATOR

Voluntary Labor Arbitration Tribunal

In the Matter of the Arbitration
between
Transport Workers Union of Philadelphia
and

Award

Southeastern Pennsylvania
Transportation Authority

The Undersigned Arbitrators, having been designated in
accordance with the Arbitration Agreement entered into by
the above-named Parties and having duly heard the proofs and
allegations of the Parties, Award, as follows:
Based on the evidence and the appropriate standard of proof, the condition of Robert Burton on
September 7, 1968 while on duty was as charged
by the Company and within the definition of
Section 202(h) as defined by a well established
line of arbitration cases between the parties hereto. Therefore the discharge of Robert Burton is
sustained. The Chairman chooses not to write an
explanatory Opinion.

March 2 7 1969
Chairman

March

1969

Arthur Wilkins
Company Arbitrator
Concurring

March

1969

Ned LeDonne
Union Arbitrator
Dissenting

Case No. 14 30 0795 68

AMERICAN ARBITRATION ASSOCIATION,

ADMINISTRATOR

I

In the Matter of the Arbitration

'

United Papermakers and Paperworkers
Local 800 AFL-CIO

'
'
i
'

and
Johns-Manville Products Corporation

Award

'

i

The Undersigned Arbitrator, having been designated in
accordance with the Arbitration Agreement entered into by the
above-named Parties and dated August 16, 1968 and having duly
heard the proofs and allegations of the Parties, Awards as
follows:
With respect to overtime for employees John
Carlson and Francis Gannone, the Company did
not violate the contract.

Eric Jr. Schmertz
Arbitrator

|l
^

DATED: October
1969
STATE OF New York
COUNTY OF New York

)
)

On this
day of October, 1969, before me personally
came and appeared Eric J. Schmertz to me known and known to
me to be the individual described in and who executed the
foregoing instrument and he acknowledged to me that he executed the same.
Case No. 1330 0719 69

.

In the Matter of the Arbitration
between

'
'
i
United Papermakers and Paperworkers '
Local 800 AFL-CIO
'
r

and

'

Opinion

r

Johns-Manville Products Corporation

'
i

The stipulated issue is:
Did the Company violate the contract with respect
to overtime for employees John Carlson and Francis
Gannone? If so what shall be the remedy?
A hearing was held at the Company offices in Manville,
New Jersey on October 7, 1969 at which time representatives
of the above named parties appeared and were afforded full
opportunity to offer evidence and argument and to examine
and cross examine witnesses.

The parties expressly waived

the Arbitrator's oath.
The parties are in dispute over the substance of a
"local department overtime agreement."
Article XXII Section 75 of the contract reads:
Overtime work shall be divided among employees in
a given department in accordance with local department agreements. These agreements to be approved
by the President of the Union and the Industrial
Relations Manager. These agreements shall not be
changed except by mutual consent. The record of
all overtime shall be posted in the department.
The overtime list will run perpetual.
There is no dispute that a written local department
agreement was agreed to b7 the Union and Company on December
28, 1964.

The pertinent part of that agreement, which applies

to the Shipping Department (906)

grants the employees of that

Department a right to certain overtime work outside of the
Shipping Department - namely clean-up work in the office

- 2area of the plant, which is customarily done on Saturdays.
The parties recognize and agree that subsequent oral
modifications of a written local department overtime agreement, or oral local agreements in lieu of those in writing,
are enforceable under the foregoing contract clause.

There

is no dispute that several other departments handle their
overtime assignments in accordance with oral agreements. And
there is no effort in this proceeding to overturn the validity of such agreements.

In the instant case both sides claim

that the written agreement of December 28, 1964 was changed
by a subsequent mutually agreed upon oral understanding, relating to the use of Shipping Department personnel on overtime for office clean-up work.

But they disagree on the sub-

stance of what was subsequent!}?* discussed.
The Union claims that some time in August, 1965, the employees in the Shipping Department, through the Union, waived
their right to claim clean-up work in the office areas on an
overtime basis; agreeing instead that it be assigned consistently to the lead man ("Rocky"); with the proviso that such
overtime work could be reclaimed by any member of the Shipping
Department upon notice to the foreman.

The instant grievance

arose when grievant Gannone, after bumping into the Shipping
Department some time in 1968 notified the foreman that he
sought the clean-up work in the office areas on an overtime
basis.

Following denials of his request, the instant griev-

ance was filed in April 1969.
The Company's version of the subsequent oral understanding is different.

It contends that that understanding was

- 3 limited to a waiver by the Shipping Department employees of
their right to claim the office clean-up work on an overtime
basis and by their agreement to permit its consistent assignment to "Rocky," the lead man.

The Company denies that the

understanding included the proviso that Shipping Department
employees could subsequently reclaim that work upon notice
to the foreman.
The evidence on the scope and substance of the subsequent
oral understanding is in sharp conflict and represents a
standoff.

The Union official who participated in the nego-

tiations testified in support of the Union's position.

A

Company representative, who was the Union Shop steward at the
time, and who also was present when the oral discussions took
place between the Union and the Company foreman, testified in
support of the Company's version of what occurred.

Frankly,

without any other direct evidence of what took place at that
time, I am constrained to find that there was no "meeting of
the minds."

The Union may well have thought that a proviso

allowing the Shipping; Department employees to reclaim the
overtime opportunity was part of the agreement; and the Company might well have believed that it was not.

The discussions

at that time between representatives of the parties appear to
have been informal and casual, and now difficult to reconstruct
precisely.

So, though written agreements may be changed by

subsequent mutually reached oral understandings, those subsequent understanding must be proved in order to be effective.
Here there is insufficient proof, one way or the other, of the
elements of the subsequent agreement, and hence its effective-

- 4ness cannot be established.

It follows that if there was no

effective subsequent oral agreement, the written agreement
of December 28, 1964 still obtains and was in effect when the
circumstances giving rise to this grievance occurred.

That

written agreement under Section 5C reads:
Clean-up or overtime of general nature.
Lowest overtime man or men.
Under the foregoing, the lowest overtime man or men of
the Shipping Department may claim office clean-up work on an
overtime basis.

The record indicates that for the period of

time involved, the grievants (especially Gannone who was the
only grievant to appear and testify at the hearing) were not
the lowest overtime men on the particular Saturdays involved.
The)/- would have been reached for the office clean-up work if
other men in the Shipping Department, lower on the overtime
list, declined that work.

One can only speculate whether

those other employees would have in fact declined that work
had it been offered to them in accordance with the written
overtime agreement.

It is just as likely that one or some

of them would have accepted the work, as to decline it, had
they then known that no effective subsequent oral understanding had been reached to change the terms of the earlier
written agreement.

So I am unable to tell and therefore un-

able to conclude that either of the grievants would have been
reached or were entitled to the overtime work during the
period involved, had the provisions of Section 5C of the
December 28, 1964 agreement been utilized.

According^, the

Union's claim for pay for either of the grievants for any

- 5 of the Saturdays worked by the lead man in cleaning the
office spacess is denied.

Eric fi. Schmertz
Arbitrator

t^L
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IMPARTIAL CHAIRMAN, NEW YORK CITY TAXICAB

INDUSTRY

Local Union #3036
New York City Taxi Drivers Union, AFL-CIO
and

AWARD

Metropolitan Taxicab Board of Trade
on behalf of its Members
Pursuant to Article XXXV of the Collective Bargaining
Agreement, the above named parties have submitted to me for
determination their unresolved disputes concerning

minimum

hourly wage rates and equalization of inequities for "inside
men. "
The pertinent parts of Article XXXV read:
CLASSIFICATION AND EQUALIZATION
Section 1. The Classification of all inside, service
and maintenance personnel covered by the terms and
provisions of this agreement, excluding taxicab drivers, shall be in the categories as already determined
by the parties„
Section 2. Equalization as to inequities, if any, and
minimum hourly wage rates for each Classification
shall be determined by the Impartial Chairman at the
earliest possible opportunity.
Hearings were held on December 10, 11 and 18, 1968 and
January 6, 1969.

Representatives of the parties appeared at

all the hearings and were afforded full opportunity to present
their respective cases.

Both sides placed into the record a

considerable quantity of testimony, argument, statistics,
data, charts, and other documentary evidence in support of
their respective contentions regarding minimum wage rates
and the equalization of inequities for the "inside personnel."
Scope of the Issue
As part of the negotiations for the current Collective
Bargaining Agreement, the parties agreed upon five job

- 2classifications for the inside personnel, namely: Utilityman
(unlicensed and licensed) Mechanic's Helper, BodymanJs Helper,
Mechanic and Bodyman.

Section 1 of Article XXXV makes refer-

ence to the agreement of the parties on these categories.
However, though each inside employee has been placed within
one of these five job classifications, and presumably is performing work within the job content of the classification in
which he is slotted, there seems to be no industry-wide uniformity as to the precise nature of the work required of
each classification or the relative skills of employees similarly classified, or the rates of pay which they receive.
There is evidence that the work duties of any of the classifications may significantly vary from garage to garage and even
within a garage.

Also there are indications that employees

within the same classification may differ significantly in
their skills.

As to wages, the hourly rates ascend from Utility-

man to Bodyman in the order of the classifications previously
enumerated.

However, each classification has within it wide

variations in pay rates, including, in some instances, a
lesser rate for employees with greater seniority in the classifications as compared to the wages of newer employees in
the same classification.

This latter situation may be due

in some cases, to a disparity in the duties performed or in
the relative skills of the employees.

But I am satisfied

that it also reflects inequities which call for a remedy.
However, notwithstanding the possible need, this particular proceeding does not involve a re-structuring, a re-organ

- 3 ization or the effectuation of a re-negotiated wage structure
for the inside men.

Article XXXV does not give me such sweep-

ing authority even if I concluded that a major overhaul of
the wage structure for inside men was warranted.
is much more narrow.

My authority

It is to fix minimum hourly wage rates

for each classification and to equalize inequities if any.
If the parties intended to empower the Impartial Chairman under Article XXXV to re-study and totally re-organize the existing wage structure of inside personnel, that intent, by
contract language, would and should have been included within Article XXXV.

But it was not.

Instead the parties lim-

ited the Chairman to two items - minimum rates and equalization of inequities.

Indeed, if more had been intended, I

consider it doubtful in the extreme that the parties would
have negotiated the present wage structure (with its initial 5%
increase) and especially the 570 across the board wage increases effective November 17, 1968 and November 17, 1969.
If the Chairman was to be empowered to re-organize the entire
wage structure or to render an AWARD which in effect would
constitute a re-negotiation of the wages, the 5% wage increases (or at least the latter two) would have been left to
the Chairman's determination, and not agreed to as an unconditional contract provision^
Moreover, I am persuaded that my authority to fix minimums and to correct inequities, if any, are within the
frame of the existing inside personnel wage structure,,

Cer-

tainly the language "equalization as to inequities, if any"
(emphasis supplied) must refer if it is to have any meaning

- 4 at all, to an existing or present wage structure within which
there may be inequities.

In other words inequities cannot

exist in a vacuum; but rather within a present frame of reference.

Therefore I conclude that the parties intended to em-

power the Impartial Chairman to fix minimum rates for the
five aforementioned

classifications; but beyond that, not to

change existing wage rates within the current wage structure
except if and where he finds an inequity.
Accordingly I am satisfied that my authority to determine minimums and to correct inequities, if any, is an intrataxicab industry matter.

The questions therefore, are, within

the frame of the present Taxicab Industry wage scale for inside personnel, what shall be the minimums for each job classification and what inequities may there be that required
equalization?

Consequently I do not find controlling, a com-

parison of the Taxicab Industry wages with wages paid other
workers in entirely different fields of employment, even if
the nature of the work is similar.

Such comparisons, like a

sweeping re-structuring or re-negotiation of the Taxicab
Industry wages for inside personnel, is a matter for collective
bargaining between the parties, but is not within the authority vested in the Impartial Chairman under ArticleXXXV of
the contract.

Therefore I must reject the Union's contention

that the determination of proper minimums and the equalization of inequities can only be satisfied by lifting the
wages of the five job classifications to levels paid workers
in the Brewery Industry, the Retail Automobile and Truck Industry, the U 0 S 0 Post Office and other service industries

- 5 such as bus transportation and utilities.
However, I do find the Union's evidence in this regard
useful and relevant, not as a standard to which the Taxicab
Industry wage rates must correspond in this arbitration, but
rather as a guide to assist me in determining an appropriate
proportionate wage ratio between and amongst the five classifications of inside personnel.

To that extent, that data, to-

gether with other relevant evidence has been used in my determinations.

The balance of the evidence presented by both

sides bears directly on the question of minimums and inequities
within the Taxicab Industry's present wage structure, and of
course, was fully considered for that purpose in my final determinations „
Also the parties agree that minimums and inequities if
any, relate only to wages.

Hence, no matter how needed or

desirable, this proceeding and my authority do not extend to
establishing uniformity of duties and skills within each
classification.

These then must also remain as matters for

collective bargaining between the parties.
Retroactivity
Article XXXV mandates the Impartial Chairman to do what
the parties were unable to do by direct negotiation.

If the

parties had agreed upon minimums and the equalization of inequities, if any, there is no dispute that that agreement
would have gone into effect as of January 29, 1968, the commencement of the present contract.

And the inside personnel

would have enjoyed new minimums and any adjustment in inequities for the entire period from January 29, just as the

- 6drivers have been covered by agreed upon wage rates since
that date.

As I see it, if I am to do what the parties them-

selves were unable to accomplish, my decision should be effective as if the parties had themselves agreed.
as of January 29, 1968.

And that means

The Bnployers knew there would be

a period of negotiations on the question following consummation of the current contract and that that period would certainly result in some delay in deciding minimums and inequities.

And it was also foreseeable that further delay would re-

sult if the parties could not agree in those subsequent negotiations and, as it turned out,. the matter required submission
to the Impartial Chairman as specifically prescribed by
Article XXXV.

Yet no limitation on retroactivity was negotia-

ed.
And while I appreciate the fact that the Industry probably did not expect the delay to extend as it has beyond one
year, I find no basis upon which the effective date of my
basic decision can be later than January 29, 1968.

For to

deprive the inside personnel of minimums and other possible
adjustments of inequities for the full term of the contract,
would be to fashion an arbitral inequity, especially where
there is no contractual basis for doing so and where the
circumstances of delay were not unforeseeable.

In short, I

see my task as that of making decisions, on what in my best
judgment, the parties would have agreed to as of January 29,
1968, if they had been able to do so0

To do that my decisions

should not only coincide with what I believe would have been
substantively negotiated, but as to what the effective date

- 7would have been as well.

Therefore, my AWARDS in this case

shall be retroactive to January 29, 1968, plus where appropriate, additional increases effective on November 17, 1968
and November 17, 1969, the dates of the negotiated 5% across
the board wage increases.
No Diminution of Wages
Under the terms of my AWARDS in this proceeding, no
"inside man" in any of the five job classifications shall
suffer any reduction or diminution in the rates of pay he is
presently earning; and I so AWARD.
Minimums
There is no real dispute between the parties over the
meaning of a minimum wage rate.

It means the hiring rate;

the beginning rate for the particular job classification;
and the rate below which no employee in that classification
should be paid.

Per force therefore, more present employees

are and shall be paid more than the minimum rate.

For it

must be noted that a minimum rate, as defined, is not an
average rate, or a median or mean rate.

It is not the rate

at which most of the employees are paid, nor some mid-point
between a high rate and a low rate, but rather the lowest
rate to be paid anyone working in that classification.
Therefore, the parties recognize I am sure, that my
authority to fix minimum rates applies to the relatively
lesser percentage of employees at the lower levels of the
wage scale, but that that authority does not extend to other
employees who are earning more pay, even if for some other
reason they may be deserving of a wage increase. (Though

- 8 some may be eligible for wage increases under my ruling on
inequities.)
Based on the foregoing and upon careful study and consideration of the entire record before me, I render the
following AWARDS on minimum wage rates for the classifications
indicated:
For the period January 29 to November 17, 1968 the
minimum rates of pay are raised from their present
levels as follows:
Utilityman (unlicensed and licensed) in the
amount of 19£ and 24£ an hour respectively.
Mechanic's Helper in the amount of 34£ an hour
Bodyman's Helper in the amount of 44£ an hour
Mechanic in the amount of 49^ an hour
Bodyman in the amount of 540 an hour.
Specifically for the period January 29 to November
17, 1968 the minimum hourly wage rates shall be;
Utilityman (unlicensed)
Utilityman (licensed)
Mechanic's Helper
Bodyman's Helper
Mechanic
Bodyman

$1.79
1.84
2.09
2.29
2.59
3. 24

I am persuaded that had the parties been able to
negotiate minimums, the 5% across the board wage
increase effective November 17, 1968 would also
have been applied to the minimum wage rate thereby increasing those rates by 5% as of November 17,
1968.

Accordingly effective November 17, 1968 the

minimum hourly wage rates (rounded off to the nearest cent) shall be;

- 9 Utilityman (unlicensed)
Utilityman (licensed)
Mechanic's Helper
Bodyman's Helper
Mechanic
Bodyman

$1.88
1.93
2.19
2.40
2.72
3.40

The foregoing minimums effective November 17, 1968
respectively for each of the classifications represent increases of 28^, 33£, 44c, 55£, 62£ and 70<;
an hour over the presently existing lowest rate.
It is my AWARD that any employee who was or is paid
less than the foregoing minimum rates, during the
periods specified, shall receive appropriate increases for his time of employment during the periods
involved.

The Employers shall have thirty (30) days

from the date of this AWARD to make payments due
hereunder.
Prospectively, and consistent with the foregoing,
the 57o general wage increase effective November 17,
1969 shall be applied to the minimums as of that
date.

So that effective November 17, 1969 the min-

imum hourly wage rates shall be:
Utilityman (unlicensed)
Utilityman (licensed)
Mechanic's Helper
Bodyman's Helper
Mechanic
Bodyman

$1.97
2.03
2.30
2.52
2.86
3.57

I am satisfied that these increases, for the periods referred to above, are sufficiently substantial to significantly raise the earnings of those at the lower wage levels; to
serve as a step towards making inside work in the Taxicab
Industry attractive to new hires; are equitably warranted;

- 10 and within the Industry's ability to pay.

To have fixed

higher minimums, especially with the mandated retroactivity,
might well endanger the Employers financially, to the self
defeating end that some of their businesses and the jobs of
their employees may be jeopardized„
Equalization as to Inequities
Based on the record I find the following circumstances
to be inequities warranting equalization:
1. An employee who is paid less than some other
employee(s) in the same classification, though
he is of substantially equal or greater seniority and possesses relatively equal or greater
skills and performs substantially the same or
more difficult work.

In such case the pay of

the former shall be increased to the level of
the latter, and I so AWARD for the period of the
time such condition obtained, retroactive to
January 29, 1968.
2. Where an employee regularly or for significant
periods of time, performs work or duties within
a higher rated job classification, it is an inequity if he is not paid the wage rate of that
higher classification.

He shall be paid at the

higher rate for the time spent on the work of the
higher classification, and I so AWARD, retroactive to January 29, 1968.

For example if a

Mechanic's Helper regularly or for significant
periods of time performs the work of a Mechanic,

- 11 he shall be paid the Mechanic's rate of pay
for the period of time he so serves.

The same

applies to out-of-title work, on the same basis
to the other classifications of inside personnel,
This AWARD does not apply where an employee is
called upon to perform duties in a higher classification in bona fide emergencies; where he is
undertaking training mutually agreed upon by
representatives of the parties; or in the event
of such short run necessities as "hacking up"
and putting on and removing snow tires.

In connection with #1 and #2 above, no specific
cases or examples of these inequities were presented during the arbitration hearings„

But

based on the evidence before me I think it probable that these two types of inequities da in
fact exist, to some extent.

Therefore I shall

leave it to the parties to implement the AWARDS
in #1 and #2 above to whatever specific situations they apply.

Disputes or disagreements on

the applicability of the AWARDS may be submitted
to me for rulings on a case by case basis„

- 12 Though I appreciate the general theory that employees
with greater longevity in a classification should receive,
in recognition of that longevity, more pay than those with
fewer years of service, I am not prepared to hold, within
the scope of this proceeding, that longevity alone is the
basis for a higher wage rate.

In other words, because at

present, skill and job duties are also revelant and proper
factors in determining an employee's rate of pay within a
classification, I cannot conclude solely on the basis of
relative seniority that a lower rate of pay for more senior
employees is an inequity„
To so conclude would involve the establishment of an
"automatic progression," or a range of rates, which grant
wage increases on the basis of years of service only.

As such,

because that would change the relevant factors upon which
wages are based, and because I do not find the present factors, if properly applied, to be unreasonable, its introduction, no matter how desirable a benefit for long service employees, is a matter which I must leave to collective bargaining between the parties.
However, as I have held in Paragraph #1 above, it is an
inequity if a senior employee is paid significantly less than
a junior employee in the same job classification where the former possesses as much or greater skills and is performing substantially the same or more skilled work.

And the same is

true if their respective seniorities are substantially the
same.

My AWARD under Paragraph #1 fashions a remedy and a

procedure for implementing that remedy where this inequity
exists.
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Eric/J. Schmertz
Impartial Chairman

DATED: February 4, 1969
STATE OF New York
COUNTY OF New York

)ss.

On this 4th day of February, 1969, before me personally
came and appeared Eric J. Schmertz to me knownand known to
me to be the individual described in and who executed the
foregoing instrument and he acknowledged to me that he executed the same.

IMPARTIAL CHAIRMAN, NEW YORK CITY TAXICAB INDUSTRY
In the Matter of the Arbitration
between
Local Union No. 3036
New York City Taxi Drivers Union
AFL-CIO
Award

and
Metropolitan Taxicab Board of Trade, Inc,
on behalf of its Member Employers

This is the first in a series of Awards adjudicating
"past grievances," i.e. grievances which arose under the
predecessor Collective Bargaining Agreement and which were
pending when the present Collective Bargaining Agreement was
negotiated.

They are submitted to arbitration under Article

XXV Section 13 of the current contract.

It should be recog-

nized that these disputes, having arisen from the predecessor
contract which expired November 16, 1967, must be determined
under the terms of that contract, irrespective of any contractual changes which were negotiated in the present agreement,
Hearings were held at the offices of the American Arbitration Association on February 5 and February 18, 1969.

Repre-

sentatives of the above named Union and Employer appeared.
Also, the affected employees were given due notice of the hearings, and were afforded an opportunity to appear and be heard.
All concerned were given full opportunity to present evidence
and testimony and to examine and cross examine witnesses.
At the outset of the first hearing I denied the motion
of coijfeel for the Board of Trade that the grievances be dismissed because they were untimely.

I ruled that I would not

" foreclose the Union or the affected employees from seeking a

- 2 determination of these grievances on the merits merely because
they were not submitted to me within 60 days after the effective date of the current contract or within 60 days of my
appointment as Impartial Chairman.
My ruling was based on the fact that considerable time
elapsed between the effective date of the contract and my
appointment; and that the Union required some time to organize
its grievance-handling procedures, to examine the large quantity of grievances pending in order to determine which were
proper subjects for arbitration.

For those reasons, I ruled

that the time limit set forth in Section 13, was directory rather than mandatory.

However, I stated that the lapse of time

between the effective date of the contract and the ultimate
submission of the grievances to arbitration would not be
prejudicial to the Employers in those cases, if any, of "running" liability.

Also I stated that my ruling was confined

to Article XXV Section 13, and consequently only to those
"past grievances" which arose under the predecessor contract
and which were pending at the time that the current contract
was negotiated.

Accordingly my ruling may not be construed

as a precedent with regard to any other time limits set forth
elsewhere in the grievance procedure or in any other part of
the contract.
Heard to completion, conceded or withdrawn, or heard and
continuing were the grievances of Messrs. Carlos Souffront,
Simon Semidei, Emanuel Grapanzano, John Bilgeshausen, Michael
Burke, Peter Mitronick, Garland McMillan, Matteo Dionisio,
Alfred Ruoff, George Ruoff, Dominick DeBellis, Ernest
Collette, Paul Quartuccio, Fred Harland, Gerald Solomon,

- 3 Blaise Noto, A. Lopez, Charles Wexler, Sidney Stone, Abraham
Glass, Edward Fischer, George Robinson, Gerald Martignette,
Harry Berger, Ralph Esposito, Morris Sonenfeldt, Max Rennert
and Joseph Markoe.
Having duly considered the evidence, testimony and argument presented by the parties, I render the following Awards:
The grievance of Carlos Souffront is granted.
Based on the evidence it is clear that he has met the
eligibility requirements of the predecessor contract
for a second week of vacation pay. Accordingly, the
Employer (Cab Operating Co.) shall pay Mr. Souffront's
claim for a second week of vacation.
The grievance of Simon Semidei is granted.
His actual time worked during the second quarterannual period of 1966 was 58 days. These 58 days
were worked during the period May 17 through
June 30. The Employer contends that Mr. Semidei
is two days short of the required minimum of 60
days as set forth in the first paragraph of
Article IV; and that because this Employer (Haso
Maintenance) did not previously pay an attendance
bonus, Mr. Semidei's eligibility commences with
May 17. While I do not find that the Christmas
bonus paid by this Employer in prior years constituted an "attendance bonus" within the meaning
of Article IV, I do find that Mr. Semidei1s eligibility, for the purpose of accumulating at least 60
days, shall be retroactive to May 12 to include credit for the strike days (May 12 through May 16.) The
last paragraph of Article IV states unconditionally,
that an employee shall be given credit for all benefits for the days he was scheduled to work from
May 12 to May 16, 1966. That paragraph, by its own
language, applies to all the benefits and all the circumstances set forth in Article IV. So whereas the
other provisions of Article IV spell out the manner
in which the attendance bonus is to be calculated,
this last paragraph expressly entitles an employee,
for purposes of determining his eligibility, to include the days he would have worked from May 12 to
May 16 as well as the days actually worked from
May 17 to the end of that quarter-annual period.
As Mr. Semidei would have been scheduled for at least
two days of work during the period May 12 through
May 16, he thereby achieved the 60 days required for
the attendance bonus. Accordingly, Haso Maintenance
shall pay Mr. Semidei's claim for the attendance
bonus.

- 4The grievance of Emanuel Crapanzano is denied.
Under Article VII, a threshold requirement for vacation pay is that the employee be "on the payroll on
June 30 of each year." Mr. Crapanzano quit his
job with the Employer (Carrick) on June 22, thereby terminating his employment that day. Thus, he
was not on the payroll on June 30, and is not
eligible for any vacation pay under the predecessor
contract.
The grievances of Matteo Dionisio and Alfred Ruoff
are denied. Under the predecessor contract there
is no provision for industry-wide seniority, nor
is there any "follow the work" provision which
would preserve an employee's seniority if, as the
result of a sale of a taxicab, he transferred his
employment from one employer to another. Hence
for purposes of accumulating time worked to meet
the eligibility requirements for vacation pay, I
am unable to credit these employees with the periods of time they worked for two separate employers. When they left the New Yorker Fleet and
took jobs with Flex, their seniority with the former ended, and their seniority with the latter
began as new employees. Though they transferred
their employment apparently because taxicabs were
sold by New Yorker to Flex, the predecessor contract does not allow the time worked at the former to be "tacked" to the time worked at the latter for purposes of vacation pay. Article VII
provides for periods of employment with "the Company" which, in the singular, means an individual
employer. It does not contemplate the merger of
work periods between and amongst identifiably
separate employers, even though there was no break
in the employment of these employees within the
industry. Therefore Messrs. Dionisio and Alfred
Ruoff did not acquire the requisite 240 days of
actual work "for the Company" to be entitled to
vacation pay.
The grievance of A. Lopez is denied. Mr. Lopez
also seeks to "tack" his employment at two separate employers in order to achieve the required
240 days of work for vacation pay. The rule enunciated in the Award immediately above is similarly applicable here. Also, as distinguished from
Messrs. Dionosio and Alfred Ruoff, Mr. Lopez did
not "follow the work" in transferring his employment from Frenat to Flex. So there is even less
equitable argument, irrespective of the contract
bar, to his claim. Moreover, the evidence does
not support the assertion that the subsequent employer promised him credit for the days he worked
at the previous company. Therefore Mr. Lopez
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eligible for a vacation under Article VII of the
predecessor contract.
The grievance of Charles Wexler is denied, My
ruling on the absence of a contractual right under the predecessor agreement to industry-wide
seniority is applicable to this grievance as
well. Though given due notice, Mr. Wexler did not
appear at the hearing. Consequently the Union was
unable to present evidence in support of his claim
that his Employer (Cab Operating Co.) promised to
credit him for time worked from his prior employment with Haber Garage. Therefore Mr. Wexler
lacks the required time worked for a vacation under Article VII of the predecessor contract.
The grievance of Sidney Stone is denied. The
absence of industry-wide seniority of a provision
for "following the work" from one employer to
another, is also applicable to this grievance.
Mr. Stone was discharged by Capital and thereafter,
without delay, was hired by Mann. Though both employers are housed at one location, there is no evidence that they are not separate companies, independent of each other. They are separately owned
by different persons (though brothers-in-law) and
Mann is a tenant in Capital's garage. So, because
Mr. Stone's days worked for Capital may not be
tacked to the days he worked for Mann, he has not
met the eligibility requirements for a vacation
under Article VII of the predecessor contract.
The grievances of Paul Quartuccio, Fred Harland,
Gerald Solomon and Blaise Noto were withdrawn from
arbitration by the Union.
The grievance of George Robinson was conceded and
granted by the Employer (Super). Therefore Mr.
Robinson shall be paid his claim for a second week
of vacation.
The grievance of Harry Berger was conceded and
granted by the Employer (M & S Garage.)Therefore
Mr. Berger's claim for one week vacation shall
be paid.
The grievance of Gerald Martignette is granted.
Under the second paragraph of Section 1 of Article
VII, an employee is entitled to two weeks of vacation pay if he has worked at least 240 days for
the company during the vacation year (July 1 to
June 30) and has four years or more of credited
service. The latter qualification (four years or
more of credited service) is not limited to any
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with the Company, provided his total period of
employment has been continuous. I am satisfied
that Mr. Martignette has met this condition.
His employment with this Company continued unbroken, either on full time or part time, from
1960. From 1960 to near the end of 1962 he
worked full time, thereby acquiring three years
of full time credited service. From 1962 to 1966,
though employed elsewhere out of the industry, he
retained his employee status with the Company as
a part time driver. At no time did he quit or
leave the Company's employ, though his status
changed from full to part time. In 1966 he returned as a full time driver, and by the end of
that year had acquired his fourth year of credited service as a full time employee. There is no
dispute that in 1966 he worked more than the requisite 240 days as a full time employee,, Therefore, because I find his employment was continuous between 1960 and 1966, and that within that
period of time he acquired four years as a full
time employee; plus the fact that it is undisputed that he worked more than 240 days as a full
time employee in 1966, he has met the eligibility
requirements of Article VII for two weeks vacation pay. He was paid for one week. Therefore,
the Employer (Cab Management) shall pay his claim
for a second week of vacation.
The grievance of Ralph Esposito is denied. This
claim for pay for a second week of vacation is advanced on the same basis as that immediately above
(Martignette). But I find one significant and determinative difference. Unlike Mr. Martignette,
Mr. Esposito did not maintain continuous employment
with the Company (Main Operating). His acquisition
of four years as a full time employee plus 240 days
work during the vacation year involved, was not
within a continuous period of employment. Therefore he cannot be credited with the requisite four
years seniority. During some years before 1963 he
worked full time. It is based on those years of
service that his claim for all or part of four
years credited service as a full time employee is
based. But there is no dispute that he did not
work at all for the Company between August 2, 1962 and
February 18, 1963; nor from August 10, 1964 to February 14, 1965. I cannot interpret these periods of
non-employment with the Company as anything other
than quits. Therefore as late as August 10, 1964,
he had terminated his employment with this Company,
and under the terms of the predecessor contract
lost all seniority thereby, including any service
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When he returned to the Company's employ the
last time, on February 14, 1965, he did so as
a new hire. Because I cannot give Mr. Esposito
credit for his service prior to the date that he
was re-employed as a new hire, he is ineligible
for a second week of vacation pay. The result
would be the same even if I accepted Mr. Esposito1s
explanation that between August 10, 1964 and February 14, 1965 he was at work within the industry
at another garage where he was sent by this Company because it had no cabs available for him.
For if, as I must, deem his absence from work
from August 2, 1962 to February 18, 1963 as a
quit, he was a new hire on a full time basis no
earlier than August 10, 1964. But even on that
basis he cannot be credited for time worked as a
full time employee in earlier years, and again
would not have achieved the four years of credited service required to be eligible for a second
week of vacation pay.
The grievances of Morris Sonenfeldt and Max
Rennert were conceded and granted by the Employer
(Metro). Therefore Mr. Sonenfeldt's claim for
one week vacation and Mr. Rennert's claim for a
second week of vacation shall be paid by the
Employer.
The grievance of Joseph Markoe is denied„ The
question here is whether Mr. Markoe should be given credit, for purposes of vacation pay eligibility,
for 18 days during which he was away from work due
to an injury apparently incurred in the course of
his employment. Though it is not part of the written
contract there is no dispute that the parties agreed
to give credit for "compensation days," among other
specified absences0 I am satisfied that in order to
insure the bona fides of time to be credited due to
injuries on the job, the parties agreed to limit
such credit to days "on workmen's compensation," or
in other words, only when and while an employee was
drawing workmen's compensation payments. So, though
not doubting the veracity of Mr. Markoe1s contention
that he was injured in the course of his employment;
and without questioning the fact that that injury
might have been the subject of a workmen's compensation claim; and further, without questioning Mr.
Markoe's right to pursue his private remedy in a
negligence action against the third party, the fact
remains that he neither sought nor drew workmen's
compensation benefits. Hence I cannot construe his
absence of 18 days as "compensation days" within the
meaning intended by the parties. Therefore, without
credit for those days, Mr. Markoe did not work the

- 8 required 240 days during the vacation year and
is not eligible for one week of vacation pay.
The remaining grievances, namely those of Messrs.
John Bilgeshausen, Michael Burke, Peter Mitronick,
Garland McMillan, George Ruoff, Dominick DeBellis,
Ernest Collette, Abraham Glass and Edward Fischer
are continuing, pending further hearings or additional information from either or both parties.
Hearings on other "past grievances" are scheduled
for March 5, 11, 12, 13 and 14, 1969.

Eric XJ. Schmertz
Impartial Chairman

DATED: March

1969

STATE OF New York
COUNTY OF New York
On this ^
day of March, 1969, before me personally came
and appeared Eric J. Schmertz to me known and known to me to
be the individual described in and who executed the foregoing
instrument and he acknowledged to me that he executed the same

IMPARTIAL CHAIRMAN NEW YORK CITY TAXICAB INDUSTRY

In the Matter of the Arbitration
between

'
'
i

Local Union #3036, New York City
Taxi Drivers Union, AFL-CIO

'
'
i

and

'
i

AWARD

Metropolitan Taxicab Board of Trade, Inc. '
on behalf of member Columbia Garage
'

The issue in dispute is whether those employees of the
Columbia Garage who received a Christmas bonus for the year
or years prior to 1968, but did not receive a Christmas bonus
for 1968, are entitled to that bonus for that latter year.
A hearing was held at the offices of the American
Arbitration Association on June 10, 1969, at which time representatives of Local #3036, hereinafter referred to as the
"Union," and Columbia Garage, hereinafter referred to as the
"Employer" appeared.

A group of affected employees, herein-

after referred to as the "grievants" appeared as well. Full
opportunity was afforded all concerned to offer evidence and
argument and to examine and cross examine witnesses.
The Employer raised a threshold issue of arbitrability
on which I ruled at the hearing.

I held that the grievances

were arbitrable and in compliance with the notice and time
limit provisions of Article XXV (Adjustment of Grievances
and Arbitration) of the contract.

I ruled that the letter of

November 27, 1968 from counsel for the Employer to the Impart
ial Chairman requesting a hearing on the dispute herein, constituted the filing of this matter for arbitration.

Either

- 2 party may request arbitration of an unresolved dispute.

That

letter coincided with the date that the Employer notified his
employees that Christmas bonuses would not be paid in 1968.
Therefore the Union was entitled to assume that that letter
noticed the dispute for arbitration and no further action under the provisions and time limits of the grievance procedure
was necessary.
On the merits the dispute involves the application and
interpretation

of Article XVII (Continuing Benefits) of the

current Collective Bargaining Agreement, which reads:
Benefits formerly granted on a regular basis to the
employees covered hereby (which were granted prior
to the present contract negotiations or prior to the
contract which terminated on November 16, 1967) shall
be continued, with the exception of vacation benefits,
Christmas bonus and attendance bonus. In the event
it is contended that the combination of attendance
bonus and vacation payment, as set forth in this
agreement, provides less, in total, than a previous
combination of attendance bonus, vacation payment
and Christmas bonus, the matter may be taken up
through the grievance procedure, as there is to be
no reduction in the combination of attendance bonus
and vacation payment as provided by this agreement
from a prior combination of attendance bonus, vacation
payment and Christmas bonus.
Applied to the facts in the instant case, this provision
is clear.

It relates to "money" benefits.

less "vacation payment

For obviously, un-

attendance bonus and Christmas

bonus" means money payments, each would be meaningless as a
benefit.

Under the clear language of this Article, Christmas

bonus for 1968 need not be paid to any employee who received
through the combination of vacation payment and attendance
bonus as much as or more money than he had received in a
prior year from a total of vacation payment, attendance bonus

- 3 and Christmas bonus.

Put another way,

Christmas bonus for

the year 1968 is payable only to an employee whose total money benefit from vacation payment and attendance bonus was
less than what he had received in a prior year from the combination of the three benefits - vacation payment, attendance
bonus and Christmas bonus.
With the exception of the grievance of Kesten et al, all
other grievants who did not receive a Christmas bonus in the
year 1968 exceeded or equaled in money payments from the combination of vacation pay and attendance bonus, the amount of
money they had received in any prior year from the combination
of vacation pay, attendance bonus and Christmas bonus.

Hence

the Employer's decision not to pay them a Christmas bonus for
the year 1968 was in confirmity with Article XVII of the contract. (Indeed those employees who fell below the payment received from a combination of the three benefits in the prior
year or years, were paid a Christmas bonus in 1968 in order
to bring them up to the level they enjoyed previously.

Be-

cause they received a Christmas bonus in 1968, they are not
grievants in this case.)
The Union advanced an interesting and understandable
argument.

It asserts that many of the grievants received

more money in 1968 through a combination of only vacation payment and attendance bonus because of the legislated increase
in taxicab fares (which increased the driver's bookings, and
by consequence his attendance bonus) plus an improvement in
the vacation plan, which for some, extended their entitlement
from two weeks to three.

The Union argues that these improve-

- 4ments, achieved either by legislation or contract negotiations
should be excluded from the calculations under Article XVII
when comparing an employee's entitlement for 1968 with what
he received in a prior year as the only way to insure against
a real diminution in benefits.

This theory however, is not

supported by the language of the contract.

Article XVII mani-

festly contemplates both the fare increase and the vacation
plan improvement.

It provides for a comparison of the combin-

ation of attendance bonus and vacation payment, as set forth
in this agreement, with the combination of what had been received from attendance bonus, vacation pay and Christmas bonus
under the prior contract.

The phrase

"as set forth in this

agreement" means that the calculation of the attendance bonus
and vacation payment is to be in accordance with the current
contractual formula.

And that formula, either expressly or

by reference, includes the expanded vacation plan, plus in
determining attendance bonus a percentage of gross receipts
based on current taxicab fares.

For the improved vacation

plan or increased cab fares to be excluded would mean that
attendance bonuses and vacation payments were calculated not
"as set forth in the agreement," but rather on outdated rates;
inapplicable gross receipts and a former vacation plan.

And

that would be directly contrary to what Article XVII prescribes,
Accordingly all grievances except those of Kesten et al
are denied, and I so AWARD.
The grievances of Kesten et al (involving some 25 employees who received only Christmas bonuses in 1966 and 1967
but not vacation payments, attendance bonuses or Christmas

- 5 bonuses in 1966, 1967 and 1968) are granted.

The Employer is

directed to pay them a Christmas bonus for 1968.

I find that

those employees received a Christmas bonus in the prior years
on a regular basis.

Article XVII requires that they not

suffer a dimunition in 1968 as a result of a combination of
vacation pay and attendance bonus, from what they received in
total payments previously from the combination of those two
benefits and Christmas bonus.

As the Christmas bonus was the

only benefit they received in the prior years, that was the
extent of their total payment of the combination of the three
benefits.

In 1968, a combination of only vacation pay and

attendance bonus would provide them with no money at all,
which is less than what they received in the prior years
from a combination of those two benefits and a Christmas bonus.
Hence to bring them up to at least the level of the prior
year or years, a Christmas bonus for the year 1968,

equivalent

to the amount they received in the previous years, shall be
paid to those grievants and I so AWARD.

Eric £.Schmertz
Impartial Chairman

DATED:

June

1969

STATE OF New York
COUNTY OF New York

)ss.:
)

On this
day of June,- 1969, before me personally came
and appeared Eric J. Schmertz to me known and known to me to
be the individual described in and who executed the foregoing
instrument and he acknowledged to me that he executed the same,

IMPARTIAL CHAIRMAN, NEW YORK CITY TAXICAB INDUSTRY
In the Matter of the Arbitration
between

'
'
i
Local Union #3036 New York City
'
Taxi Drivers union, AFL-CIO
'
i
and
'
t
Metropolitan Taxicab Board of Trade
'
on behalf of certain Employer members. '

Award

Certain disputes between the above named parties arising
out of the current Collective Bargaining Agreement were heard
by the Undersigned Impartial Chairman at the offices of the
American Arbitration Association on August 5, 1969.

Represen-

tatives of the parties appeared and were afforded full opportunity to offer evidence and argument and to examine and cross
examine witnesses.
Having duly considered the proofs and allegations I make
the following AWARDS:
The grievances of Rubin Abraham and Onnie Denton
(Metro) for breakdown pay are denied because
neither claim was for a period of time exceeding
one hour after notification to the Employer.

,. v

I am persuaded that the "breakdown" of the
electric taxicab meter without fault of the driver,
constitutes a "breakdown" within the purpose and
intent of Article XIII of the contract. I recognize that when this contract was negotiated the
electric meters (colloquially referred to as "hot
seat" meters) were not yet installed in the taxicabs. But it is clear that the purpose of Article
XIII is to protect a driver from loss of earnings
in the event that his cab becomes inoperative on
the road, through no fault of his own.
Based on this intent, I see no difference between
a breakdown resulting from an engine or wheel
failure, by example, or a broken meter. The effect
is the same - the vehicle cannot be operated either

- 2mechanically or legally as a taxicab. And the
driver is unable to maintain his bookings due to
a circumstance beyond his control or fault.
This conclusion is reinforced by the fact that
the electric meters were unilaterally installed
by the Employers as a managerial decision subsequent to the negotiations of the current contract; and the electrical or mechanical operation
of the meters, together with repairs thereon are
within the exclusive control of the Employer.
In short, the decision to use these meters and
how they operate were not responsibilities shared
by the Union or the drivers. Consequently if the
meter fails to work properly, making it impossible
to operate the vehicle as a taxicab, the driver
should not be accorded any less protection than
if the vehicle suffered a type of breakdown undisputedly covered by Article XIII.
However in the instant cases, the loss of time
between notification to the Employer, repair of
the meter and the resumption of normal service
did not exceed one hour. And under Article XIII
breakdown pay does not begin to run until after
the first hour following notification of the breakdown. That in the case of grievant Abraham the
meter was inoperative for more than one hour before
its repair is immaterial because he did not notify
the Employer when that breakdown first occurred„
As I have found that a meter breakdown is comparable to those contemplated by Article XIII of the
contract, the notification provisions of that
Article are equally applicable. For it was no more
difficult for the grievant to notify the Employer
by telephone of the breakdown of the meter than to
notify him of any other kind of breakdown.
Hence
when grievant Abraham returned the cab to the garage for repair of the meter without an earlier call
to his Employer, notification did not take place
until then. And from that point to the time that
the meter was repaired and the cab returned to the
road, no more than one hour elapsed. So under the
time provisions of Article XIII the grievant was
not eligible for breakdown pay.
Similarly grievant Denton's claim is limited to
a meter breakdown of only one hour duration, and
hence for the same reason is precluded by the provisions of Article XIII which grants breakdown
pay for time beyond the first hour.
The grievance of Vincent DiSanto (JoFan) for reassignment of a steady cab is settled on the
following basis:

IMPARTIAL CHAIRMAN, NEW YORK CITY TAXICAB INDUSTRY

In the Matter of the Arbitration
between
Local Union #3036 New York City
Taxi Drivers Union, AFL-CIO
and

Award

Metropolitan Taxicab Board of Trade
on behalf of certain Employer members

Certain disputes between the above named parties arising
out of the current Collective Bargaining Agreement were heard
by the Undersigned Impartial Chairman at the offices of the
American Arbitration Association on August 5, 1969. Representatives of: the parties appeared and were afforded full opportunity to offer evidence and argument and to examine and cross
examine witnesses.
Having duly considered the proofs and allegations I make tie
following AWARDS:
The grievances of Rubin Abraham and Onnie Denton
(Metro) for breakdown pay are denied.
I have decided to await a subsequent case where
employees would otherwise substantively qualify,
before determining whether a "breakdown" of an
electric (hot seat) meter, on the road, without
fault of the driver, is a "breakdown" within the
meaning of Article XIII of the contract.
Here, if Article XIII applied, the grievants would
not qualify for the pay because either the total
time lost and claimed was only one hour, or the time
from notification did not exceed one hour. In the
case of the grievant Denton, there is no showing that
the total time during which his meter was inoperative
lasted more than one hour (his claim is simply for
one hour); and in the case of the grievant Abraham
no more than one hour elapsed between the time he
notified the garage of the broken meter (when he
returned the cab to the garage) and its repair and
return of the cab to service.
Under Article XIII, even if it applies, breakdown pay
commences to run not from the time of the breakdown,
but only after the passage of the first hour after
notification of the breakdown.
The grievance of Vincent DiSanto (JoFan) for reassignment of a steady cab is settled on the
following basis:

- 2 The grievant agrees to work as a regular
driver beginning work each day at 7 A.M.
and continuing until 4 P.M. He will be
given a steady cab for a trial period of
one month. If during that time he fails
to work the hours 7 A.M. to 4 P.M., the
steady cab will be taken from him.
The grievances of Ed Zarr et al are in abeyance pending further word from the parties.

Erie7'J. Schmertz
Impartial Chairman

DATED:

August /J~T969

STATE OF New York
COUNTY OF New York

)
)' '

On this
v day of August, 1969, before me personally came
and appeared Eric J. Schmertz to me known and known to me to be
the individual described in and who executed the foregoing instrument and he acknowledged to me that he executed the same.

IMPARTIAL CHAIRMAN, NEW YORK CITY TAXICAB INDUSTRY
_-___™-_~~_™______________-_______________ _____.™_-.^
In the Matter of the Arbitration
between
Local Union #3036, New York City
Taxi Drivers Union, AFL-CIO
and

'
'
i
'
'

'
i
Metropolitan Taxicab Board of Trade, Inc. '
on behalf of Yankee Service and the 6th
'
Street Management.
'

Award

A hearing on additional "past grievances" involving the
above named parties was held at the offices of the American
Arbitration Association on July 28, 1969.

Representatives of

the parties appeared and were afforded full opportunity to
offer evidence and argument and to examine and cross examine
witnesses.

The affected employees were afforded the opportun-

ity to be present and to testify.
Having duly considered all the proofs and allegations I
make the following AWARDS:
The grievance of Benjamin Krever (6th Street Management)
was settled on the basis of payment by the Employer
of the grievant's claim for two weeks vacation for the
year 1966-1967.
The grievance of Andrew Camarado (6th Street Management)
for one week vacation pay for the year 1966-1967 is
denied. The records indicate that he actually worked
218 days within the eligibility period, and is entitled
to credit for additional 15 days on Disability. His
total of 233 days worked and credited is 7 short of
the minimum requisite of 240 days within the vacation
eligibility period.
The grievance of Harold Cohen (Yankee Service)for
two weeks vacation pay for the year 1966-1967 was
granted by the Employer.
The grievance of David Toback (Yankee Service) for
two weeks vacation pay for the year 1966-1967 is
denied. He actually worked 224 days within the vacation eligibility period. In addition the Company
credited him with a period of 15 days on Workmen's

~

- 2Compensation. The decision of the Workmen's Compensation Board introduced into the evidence indicated the period on Workmen's Compensation as
between September 21 and October 10, 1966, or
thirteen working days based on the grievant's
work schedule. So whether he was entitled to only
13 days Workmen's Compensation credit or 15 days
as accorded him by the Company, the total either
way, (respectively 239 or 237 days) falls short
of the 240 day minimum required by the predecessor
contract for any vacation pay entitlement.
The grievance of Antonio Torres (Yankee) for two
weeks vacation pay for the year 1965-1966 and for
a second week of vacation pay for the year 1966-1967
was granted by the Employer.
The grievances of Joseph Campo, Ben Watman and
Abraham Wild (Yankee Service) for attendance bonuses
for the quarter July 30 to September 30, 1966 are
continuing pending word from the parties on a proposed stipulation which may be dispositive of the
issue.
The grievances of Charles Cohen (Yankee) for a
second week of vacation pay for the year 1965-1966
and a second week of vacation pay for the year
1966-1967 are continuing to enable the Employer,
within a reasonable time, to comply with my request
that he produce the grievant's "re-employment or
re-hire application" of July 26, 1965.

EricXf. Schmertz
Impartial Chairman
DA TED: August
STATE OF New York
COUNTY OF New York
On thisP day of August, 1969, before me personally came
and appeared Eric J. Schmertz to me known and known to me to
be the individual described in and who executed the foregoing
instrument and he acknowledged to me that he executed the same.

JOS/H A. MAZUR
rfary r#fclic. State of
, 03-2595750
Qualified in Bronx County
Commission Expires March 30, !

IMPARTIAL CHAIRMAN, NEW YORK CITY TAXICAB INDUSTRY
I

In the Matter of the Arbitration
between
Local Union #3036
New York City Taxi Drivers Union
AFL-CIO
and
Metropolitan Taxicab Board of Trade, Inc.
on behalf of its Member Employers

Local Union #3036
New York City Taxi Drivers Union
AFL-CIO

'
"'
i
i
' •
'
'

Award

and
Andrea Service Corp;
Zebra Service Corp;
Jaw Service Corp.

i

Additional hearings on "past grievances"(as defined in
my Award dated March 5, 1969) were held at the offices of the
American Arbitration Association on March 5, 11, 12, 13 and
14, 1969.
Having duly considered the proofs and allegations I make
the following Awards:
The Grievance of Edward Fischer is settled. His
claim for vacation pay is granted. His claim for
call-in pay is denied.
The grievance of Irving Pass is granted.
Article VII Section 3 of the predecessor contract,
must, because of its unique terms, have a specific
frame of reference. It provides for a "split vacation" between two employers on a pro rated basis,
to qualified employees who were terminated without
cause by the former employer, or were forced to resign because of harassment by that employer. This
section, insofar as it relates to harassment (which
is the claim in the instant grievance) refers, in
my view, to complaints by the National Labor Relations Board against certain employers during the
Union's campaign for organization and recognition.

- 2 This Employer (A & A Maintenance) was among those
against whom a Board complaint for harassment was
issued. Based on this point of reference, I find
that where the Union or an employee has made a
prima facie case of harassment, a presumption favorable to that employee is created, which the employer has the burden to rebut. Here the grievant
advanced testimony claiming incidents of harassment, and the Employer responded with testimony of
denial. In other words, the evidence showing and
denying harassment represents a stand-off. In that
circumstance the Employer has not met his burden to
convincingly overturn the presumption. Therefore
the Employer (A & A Maintenance) shall pay Mr.Pass
his claim for a pro-rated vacation for the vacation
year 1966 in accordance with Article VII Section 3
of the predecessor contract.
The grievance of Abraham Litwin is denied. The
grievant was involved in nine accidents between
1961 and 1967. The evidence discloses that following an accident on January 20, 1967, he was instructed by his Employer (Frenat) to make out an
accident report, but refused. Irrespective of the
grievant's prior accident record, it is normal and
proper for an employer to direct a driver to prepare an accident report when or if an accident
occurs. Even if there be a dispute between the
driver and his employer over the accident or its
extent, the driver may not flatly refuse to make
out any report. This is especially true where, as
here, the grievant was involved in several prior
accidents. To state that he would not prepare an
accident report, when directed to do so, represents
a defiance of authority and is grounds for disciplinary action. I do not consider the three day suspension to be unreasonably severe. That the grievant
did fill out an accident report on the following
day is immaterial, for it is highly questionable
that he would have done so had he not been disciplined.
The grievance of Joseph P. Pierro was conceded and
granted by the Employer (Frenat.) Therefore Frenat
shall pay the grievant's claim for one week vacation for the year 1966.
The grievance of Angel Rios was paid by the
Employer (Rego) and is therefore settled.

'

The grievance of Morris Byer is denied. I am persuaded that on October 5, 1966, the day the grievant had an accident, he was told by the Employer's
dispatcher not to report back to work until October
8, in accordance with a policy to suspend a driver
who was at fault until his cab is repaired. There-

- 3 fore the grievant was notified by the Employer
(Jackson Maintenance) not to come to work prior
to October 8. Consequently his claim for callin pay for October 6 and 7, days he reported for
work despite such notice, is denied.
The grievance of Joseph Villano was conceded and
granted by the Employer (Jackson Maintenance)
Therefore his claim for call-in pay shall be paid.
The grievance of Miguel Robles is granted.
The grievant testified that on Monday, March 22,
1967, after reporting for work, he was sent home
because of a snow storm. The Employer testified
that he instructed his manager to inform drivers
that all those who wished to drive that day could
do so; and that later in the day cabs were actually dispatched. However, the employer's manager did not testify, so there is no evidence
that these instructions actually reached all the
men including the grievant. Rather, the grievant' s testimony that he was "sent home" stands
unrefuted. Accordingly, the Employer (Metro)
shall pay the grievant's claim for call-in pay for
march 22, 1967.
The grievance of Hyman Baer is granted.
I conclude that the Employer's (Helen Garage)
payment of vacation pay to the grievant for his
service between December 1962 and July 1, 1963
was not merely a token. Rather I deem it a recognition of a year's credited service as a full time
driver under a policy to grant such credit, in that
year, for less than 240 days worked.
Therefore,
coupled with his undisputed credited service for
the vacation years, 1964, 1965 and 1967, the grievant acquired the requisite four years of credited
service and is entitled to pay for a second week
of vacation. Helen Garage shall pay the grievant's
claim for a second week of vacation for the vacation year 1967.
The grievances of Thomas Williams, Philip Farley,
et al (55th Street) (a "mass grievance" covering
eleven grievants whose identities are known to the
parties) is settled. The Employer will pay $6.00
call-in pay to each of the grievants without prejudice to the position of the Employer regarding the
tires in use at the time the grievance arose.
The grievance of Chesta Sosna is conceded and
granted. Therefore the Employer (Frenat) shall
pay the grievant's claim for a second week of vacation pay0

- 4The grievance of Dominick D'Agostino for a second
week of vacation pay has been paid by the Employer (Cordi) and is therefore settled.
The grievances of Meyer Goldberg, Freddie Williams
and Nat Kaye are conceded and granted. Therefore
the Employer (Marby) shall pay the grievants their
claims for a second week of vacation pay.
The grievance of Leon T. Dean for a second week
of vacation pay has been paid by the Employer
(T.M.I.) and is therefore settled.
The grievance of Jack Horowitz has been paid by
the Employer (Zebra) and is therefore settled.
The grievance of Max Heidt is denied. The grievant is not eligible to a pro rata vacation from
his former Employer (Jason) under Article VII
Section 3 of the predecessor contract. Even if
harassment be shown, it did not take place in the
grievant's second or subsequent years of service
after he had qualified for one week1s vacation
pay. Rather, the charge of harassment relates to
his first year of service with Jason. And on the
same basis (his failure to meet the threshold
eligibility requirement),his claim for pro Tata
vacation against his present Employer (Forest) is
denied. I do not find that his grievance encompasses a claim against Jason for wrongful discharge and for vacation pay as damages arising
therefrom. The grievance seeks vacation based
on a total of 280 days worked between the two
employers. It goes on to state that he received
vacation in the past on the basis of 210 days worked.
Obviously, his claim for vacation pay is founded on
days worked and not on a formula of damages for a
wrongful discharge. Therefore I am unable to conclude that his grievance contains within it, even
by implication, a charge of wrongful discharge
under Article XIV Section l(c) of the contract and for
damages in the form of vacation pay arising therefrom.
Instead he seeks vacation pay only for time worked,
based on the explicit provisions of Article VII
Section 3 of the contract. As to both scope and
substance his grievance is denied.
The grievance of Jos£ Mercade (EN Garage) is denied. The grievant has not met the eligibility
requirements of four years credited service as a
full time employee. Therefore his claim for a
second week of vacation pay is denied.
The grievance of Harry Hoffman is granted. His
Employer (Zebra) who failed to appear after due

- 5 notice, shall pay Mr. Hoffman his claim for one
week of vacation pay.
The
His
due
two

grievance of Benjamin Zimmerman is granted.
Employer (Zebra), who failed to appear after
notice, shall pay Mr. Zimmerman's claim for
weeks vacation pay.

The grievance of William Saretsky is denied.
(Cromwell) The records show that the grievant
received vacation pay and was credited for a year
of service only for the years of 1965, 1966 and
1967. Therefore as of 1967, he had not acquired
the requisite four years of credited service to
be eligible for a second week of vacation that
year.
The grievance of Juan Ramos (Man Maintenance) is
denied.by default, because of the grievant's
failure to appear after due notice.
The grievance of Julius Samuels is granted.by default, because of the failure of the Employer
(Jackson) to appear after due notice. Therefore
Jackson shall pay Mr. Samuel's claim for a pro
rata vacation for the year 1966 under the provisions of Article VII Section 3 of the predecessor
contract.
The grievance of Harry Keenan is denied. I find
that the grievant's termination by the Employer
(Dover) was for just cause.
The grievance of Isadore Schechter for one week
of vacation pay for the year 1966 is granted provided the records show that he was paid for one
or more days of disability during the eligibility
period. If so, his Employer (Helen) shall pay
his claim. If the parties are in dispute over
the records, the matter may be referred back to me for
determination.
The grievance of Irving Koslow is denied. (Jason)
The grievant has not met the requisite 240 days
worked within the vacation year 1966-1967. He
worked 214 days that year. And he cannot be given
credit for approximately 40 additional days that
he was ill because he was neither on disability
nor workmen's compensation within the meaning of
the agreement of the parties on those exceptions.
The grievance of Max Pittell is denied. The question here is whether the grievant was discharged
or quit. I conclude that neither actually occurred.

- 6 But based on statements exchanged in the course
of an angry argument, Mr. Groden of the Employer
(Bebe) had reason to interpret the grievant's
remarks as a quit and the grievant had reason to
interpret Mr. Groden's remarks as notice of discharge. I am convinced that in their anger they
misinterpreted each other.
Under this circumstance the question is whether
the grievant should receive any benefits as if
he had been discharged, or whether his status
should remain as if he had quit. Since the misunderstanding arose out of a heated argument,
the answer turns, in my judgment, on who was primarily responsible for that argument. Though it
takes two to argue, I am persuaded that it would
not have occurred had the grievant complied with
a reasonable request made of him by Groden. I
find no reason why an employer may not ask a
driver involved in an accident for the details of
that accident. And I think an employer has this
right even if the driver has filled out an accident
report. Therefore Groden's request that the grievant inform him of the details of the accident was
proper even though the grievant had filled out an
accident report. The grievant did not act properly when he refused to respond to Groden's questions;
stating instead that Groden could read the accident
report. This precipitated the argument and the
final angry words between them which each misunderstood. Therefore though the grievant was not actually discharged, I do not find an equitable basis
upon which his status should be so construed for
any benefits which might flow therefrom. Accordingly, his claim for pro rated vacation from the Employer (Bebe) is denied.
The grievance of Alfred Feaster is denied. (Super).
The grievant worked 232 days during the eligibility
period for a vacation in the year 1966. If he is
credited with five additional strike days and one
extra day for a "single," his total would be 238,
or two days short of the minimum for the vacation
eligibility. Therefore his grievance for one week
vacation pay is denied.
The grievance of Lawrence P. Brown (Helen) is
denied.by default, because of the grievant's failure to appear after due notice.
The grievance of Charles Raphenberg (Iota) is denied by default because of the grievant's failure
to appear after due notice. As in the grievance
immediately above (Brown) I deem the failure of
the grievant to appear as an abandonment of his
grievance,,

- 7 The grievance of James Lloyd (Ilex) is denied
on the same basis as the two Awards immediately
above.
The grievance of Jerome Levine (Fare) was withdrawn from arbitration by the Union.
The grievance of Julius Rosensweig for two weeks
vacation pay (Frenat) was withdrawn by the Union.
The grievance of Irving Davis was paid by the
Employer (55th Street) and is therefore settled.
The grievance of Harvey Goldring is conceded and
granted by the Employer (Dover). Therefore Dover
shall pay Mr. Goldring1s claim for two weeks vacation pay.
The grievances of Michael Levine and Allie Levine
are granted. Though technically the grievants were
first on the payroll of one Employer (Prospect);
and thereafter were employed by a different Employer (Tyrone) when Prospect sold its cabs ami went
out of business, I find that by practice the grievants worked interchangeably during the earlier period for both. Indeed both Employers were garaged
at the same location and were members of a group
of twenty companies which made up "The Independent
Owners Taxi Association." There is no dispute
that this group shared mechanics, certain expenses,
ownership of the building and some trucks. I conclude that by practice, they also shared drivers, and
that the grievants worked back and forth between both
Prospect and Tyrone (before the former went out of
business), though the records may not indicate the
full extent of the interchangeability.
I consider the amount of vacation pay which Tyrone
paid the grievants for the year 1965 to be significant. Whereas the Employer testified that it was
"his program" to grant $35 or $40 in vacation pay
to first year drivers, the grievants in 1965 (which
the Employer claims was their first year of service with him) received $50 each. I am not persuaded that they received this greater amount merely because they were "good bookers." That was part
of it no doubt, but I believe it also reflected the
fact that they had worked more than casually for
Tyrone prior to 1965 while officially on the payroll of Prospect. On this basis, by the vacation
year 1966, the grievants should be credited with
at least four years of service with Tyrone. Therefore, together with the undisputed fact that they
worked at least the required 240 days during the
eligibility period, they are entitled to a second
week of vacation pay for 1966.

- 8The grievance of David Cohen for a second week
of vacation has been paid by the Employer (Garr)
and is therefore settled.
The grievance of Wilbur Haywood is denied. The
evidence indicates that the grievant had not acquired four years of credited service as a driver with the Employer (EN) to be eligible for a
second week of vacation pay in the vacation year
1966.
The grievance of Diego Araely is conceded and
granted. Therefore the Employer (Tedman) shall
pay the grievant's claim for one week vacation
pay.
The grievances of John Lopez, Irving Davidoff,
et al (Dynamic) covering 22 grievants whose
identities are known to the parties) are granted.
The parties are in dispute over the Employer's
(Dynamic) policy regarding eligibility for one
week's vacation pay. The grievants, and the
Union on their behalf, contend that the policy
was to grant vacation pay to those drivers who
worked at least 200 days between July 1st of one
year and June 30th of the next. The Employer
asserts that his policy for the year in dispute
(1965-1966) required 200 days of work within a
shorter period of time, namely September 1, 1965
through June 30, 1966. The Company states that
it established its policy in September 1965 and
posted a sign on the garage bulletin board to that
effect.
The disagreement centers on a claimed change in
policy when the Employer moved from its location
in Brooklyn to the Bronx in 1965, and when, simultaneously, it absorbed another Company (Forest)
which had also been located in Brooklyn. The record
discloses that while Dynamic operated in Brooklyn
its policy was to grant one week of vacation pay to
those drivers who worked 200 days within the period
July 1 of one year to June 30 of the next. And it
is the position of the Union that the grievants were
led to believe, and had every reason to believe
that that policy continued when Dynamic moved to
the Bronx„
The Union's position is meritoreous. If the Employer intended to change his vacation policy in
1965 by requiring the same number of days worked,
but within a shorter period of time, it was his
obligation to provide and disseminate clear notice
thereof to and among his employees. Otherwise
the employees would be entitled to rely upon the

- 9 previous practice. I am not satisfied that the
sign which he says was posted in 1965 met the
test of such notice. Indeed the Employer's representative at the hearing was unable to testify of his own knowledge about the wording of the
sign because his employment post dated both the
date that the sign was posted and the date it
was removed. So there is no direct evidence to
support the Employer's version of what the sign
said, and the sign is not now available.
Contrarywise the grievants who were then employed, testified that the sign did not reduce the
period of time within which to acquire 200 days
worked, and that it bore the name of the liquidated Company (Forest). Therefore regardless of
what it said about the period of eligibility, the
employees had good reason to believe that it was
not applicable to them, since they worked for
Dynamic. In short, if Dynamic attempted to change
its vacation policy, it failed to give the kind of
notice universally required to effectuate a change
in a previously established practice.
Accordingly, those grievants who worked 200 days
or more between the period July 1, 1965 and June
30, 1966 shall be paid their claim for one week's
vacation pay for that year.

The following grievances are continuing, pending
further hearings, or additional information from
either or both parties;
v

Americo Saccavino (Willow Maintenance) ;
Leo Lazarus (Ted Fre) ; Robert Weiss AAR) ;
-Louis- Wile (Jar Service); Samuel Regans
(EN) ;v' Stanley Rosenthal (Cordi) ; Efrain
Enduj ar (EN); the estate of Vincent Madonna (Iota) ; Ben Acocella et al (Worth Taxi) (covering eleven grievants whose identities are
known to the parties); Joseph Baglione,
Emilio Ramos; Salvatore Salerno; Julius
Rosenzweig; Nikos Kolaitis (Andrea Service);^'
Goldberg (Zebra) .

Also continuing (per my Award of March 5, 1969,)
pending further hearings or additional information from either or both parties are the grievances of;
--'•'
John Bilgeshausen, Michael Burke, Peter
Mitronick, Garland McMillan, George Ruoff ,
Dominick DeBellis, Ernest Collette, Abraham
Glass.
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With the understanding of the parties, the following grievances, which involve interpretation and
application of Article VII Section 1 and Article
XII of the predecessor contract are continuing
pending further word from the parties:
'Solomon Frielich, Salvatore Barraco, et al
(Columbia) (a "mass grievance" covering
twelve grievants whose identities are known
to the parties;) Walter Scott et al (55th
Street) (a "mass grievance" covering grievants whose identities are known to the
parties;)'Max E. Smook, Benjamin Schulman,
Burton Stark (Chase); Henry Feldman, Abraham Nemeroff, Nathan Opal, Seymour Rothchild (Willow); Sidney Binder et al (Garr)
covering eighteen grievants whose identities
are known to the parties.)
/I

A further hearing is scheduled for April 30, 1969

Eric/'j. Schmertz
Impartial Chairman

DATED:

April

1969

STATE OF New York
COUNTY OF New York

)gg .
)

On this
day of April, 1969, before me personally came
and appeared Eric J. Schmertz to me known and known to me to
be the individual described in and who executed the foregoing instrument and he acknowledged to me that he executed
the same.

IMPARTIAL CHAIRMAN, NEW YORK CITY TAXICAB INDUSTRY

In the Matter of the Arbitration
between

'
'

Metropolitan Taxicab Board of Trade, Inc.'
on behalf of Tone Operating Corp.
'
i
-andNew York City Taxi Drivers Local
Union #3036, AFL-CIO

'
i

AWARD

'
I

The Undersigned, as Impartial Chairman under the
Collective Bargaining Agreement between the above named parties
makes the following AWARD.

The refusal on September 30, 1969 of about thirtyeight employees of Tone Operating Corp. to take
out taxicabs at the beginning of their regular shift
was a work stoppage in violation of Article XXIV
of the Collective Bargaining Agreement. The Union's
claim for pay for the time lost is therefore denied.
I am satisfied that the Union officials at the
Union's central office attempted diligently to
end the work stoppage and that those officials
complied substantially with the Union's obligations under Article XXIV. The role of two Union
officials at the scene of the work stoppage is unclear. The evidence does not show conclusively
that they made a good faith effort to prevent the
stoppage or to persuade the men to return to work.
On the other hand there is not sufficient evidence
to hold that those two officials either led,
encouraged or supported the work stoppage. Accordingly, the Employer's request for money damages
is denied.
The Employer's request for an order enjoining any
repetition of the work stoppage and for an order
prohibiting any further breaches of Article XXIV
of the contract, during the term of the Collective
Agreement, is granted. Therefore, on penalty of
disciplinary action including discharge, and money
damages where warranted, I enjoin any future breach
of Article XXIV (Industrial Peace) of the contract
between the parties.

Other directives which I issued orally at the
conclusion of the hearing, and not covered by
the foregoing, are also made part of this Award;
namely that there shall be no violence of any
type between any representative of the Employer
and the employees; and that there shall be no
reprisals against any employee who appeared at
the arbitration hearing because of that appearance.

/ _^
DATED: October fe? 1969
STATE OF New York
COUNTY OF New York

Eric J S c h m e r t z
Impartial Chairman
)ss
)

On this \y day of October, 1969, before me
came and appeared Eric J. Schmertz to me known and
to be the individual described in and who executed
going instrument and he acknowledged to me that he
same.

personally
known to me
the foreexecuted the

IMPARTIAL CHAIRMAN, NEW YORK CITY TAXICAB INDUSTRY

6c1"
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In the Matter of the Arbitration
between

'
'
i

Metropolitan Taxicab Board of Trade, Inc.
on behalf of Tone Operating Corp.

'
'
i

-and-

'

New York City Taxi Drivers Local
Union #3036, AFL-CIO

I/9

OPINION

'
'
i

Based on the direct evidence (i.e. the testimony of
witnesses on the scene) I conclude that about 38 employees of
Tone engaged in a work stoppage on the afternoon of September
30, 1969 in violation of Article XXIV of the Collective Bargaining Agreement.
Despite requests from Tone's owner and other managerial
employees, as well as an effort by the Dispatcher to dispatch
cabs, those approximately 38 employees (out of a total of 54)
refused to take out their taxicabs at the beginning of their
regular shifts, and thereafter.

Clearly that concerted action

which prevented all but sixteen cabs from working that day, was
in direct violation of Article XXIV of the contract which reads:
INDUSTRIAL PEACE
During the term of this agreement, the Union, its officers,
representatives, agents and members agree that they shall not
authorize, instigate, cause, aid, encourage, support, condone or
participate in any strike, slowdown, work stoppage, boycott or
picketing or patrolling directed against, or any curtailment of
work, or restriction of, or interference with, the operations of
the Employer or any of its affiliated companies. In the event
of a strike, slowdown, work stoppage, boycott or picketing or
patrolling directed against, or any curtailment of work or
restriction of, or interference with, the operations of the
Employer or any of its affilitated companies, the Employer shall
not be required to negotiate on the merits of the dispute which
gave rise to the stoppage or curtailment or other such action
until the same has ceased.
In the event of a strike, slowdown, work stoppage, boycott or picketing or patrolling directed against, or any curtailment of work or restriction of, or interference with, the
operations of the Employer or any of its affilitated companies,
the Union shall immediately instruct the involved employees, in
writing, that their conduct is in violation of the agreement,
that they may be disciplined up to and including discharge, and

-2instruct all such persons to quit the offending conduct.
The Employer shall have the unrestricted right to
discipline, up to and including discharge, any employee who
instigates, participates in, or gives leadership to any activity
herein prohibited. If Employer discipline in this regard is
challenged through the grievance procedure and the same proceeds
to arbitration, the arbitrator shall have power to review the
reasonableness of the penalties imposed, but he may order back
pay only upon a finding of innocence. The failure of the
Employer to discharge any such employee or group of employees
shall not be construed as a waiver of the right of the Employer
to discharge other violators thereof or as an indication that
such activity is condoned by the employer.
The Employer will not lock out any employees during the
term of this agreement so long as this agreement is not violated,
The meaning of the foregoing contract clause is unequivocal and explicit.

It is an absolute prohibition against

strikes, slowdowns, work stoppages and the other enumerated
proscribed activities therein during the life of the Collective
Agreement.

It provides for no exceptions.

It means that with-

out exception, work stoppages may not be used as a method to
redress grievances or to protest the action or conduct of the
Employer, or to resolve any dispute between the parties.

If

this prohibition is not respected, the penalty of disciplinary
action up to and including discharge for the guilty employees,
is proper.

Implicit, in my view, also is a penalty of money

damages under appropriate circumstances for lost business.

And

so that the picture is complete,because Article XXIV also prohibits "lock-outs" by the Employer under the conditions stated,
a breach of this latter provision by the Employer would, in my
view, make him liable for payment of loss of earnings and other
benefits to the affected employees.
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Read together with the immediate succeeding contract
section, Article XXV (Adjustment of Grievances and Arbitration),
the proper method for redressing alleged wrongs, and/or for the
resolution of any and all disputes arising out of the employment
realtionship, is manifest - by using the grievance and arbitration provisions of the contract.

In other words, there is only

one proper way to settle disputes between the employees (and the
Union on their behalf) and the Employer, and that is through
the grievance procedure, including arbitration, as mandated by
Article XXV,

Put another way, so that there is no mistake,

strikes, slowdowns, work stoppages (and the other actions prohibited by Article XXIV) may not be resorted to where there is
a dispute between the parties, or for any other reason, during
the life of this contract; instead disputes must be resolved
through the grievance procedure, and by arbitration, if necessary
As this is the first case of this type which has required an
Award during my term as Impartial Chairman, I take this opportunity
to emphasize the foregoing interpretation and application of
Articles XXIV and XXV, not just as notice to the employees at
Tone, but to everyone else on both sides covered by this
industry-wide contract.
As the Impartial Chairman I am bound to the terms of the
contract as negotiated by the parties.

It is my obligation to

interpret, apply and enforce those terms.

I have no authority

to vary those terms or legislate new provisions.

Therefore I

must and shall strictly enforce the "no strike" and " no lockout" provisions of the contract, and shall require that any and
all disputes between the parties be resolved in a peaceful and
responsible manner through the grievance procedure and in

-4arbitration.

Indeed this interpretation is such a well

settled principle of sound and orderly labor relations during
the term of any collective bargaining agreement, that it should
hardly need further enunciation here.

The fact is that I can con

ceive of no dispute whatsoever which cannot be fully and adequate
ly resolved through the grievance procedure and/or arbitration.
Where the Employer has committed a wrong, the Impartial Chairman
will redress that wrong in arbitration, if the parties are unable
to settle it in the grievance steps.

If, as a result an employee

has suffered a monetary loss, or any other benefit loss and is
entitled to reimbursement or restoration, the Impartial Chairman
will make him whole.
Specifically, with reference to discharges (which
apparently precipitated the work stoppage in the instant case),
the propriety thereof are matters which may be properly brought
to arbitration before the Impartial Chairman.

And if the

discharges were improper, the affected employees will be reinstated with back pay and full benefits.

So there is no need for

any other action or "self Help" by the employees in that type of
dispute or any other.
Having found that about thirty-eight employees engaged
in a work stoppage, the events that followed are largely
immaterial, so far as Article XXIV is concerned.

It may well

be that the Employer's handling of the Union Committee thereafter
was inept or provacative or even delayed the return to work.
I make no judgement one way or the other because none of the
heated exchanges at the scene would have taken place had there
not been first an illegal work stoppage by a substantial number

-5of the employees.

Similarly, in view of the stoppage, and, as

I have found a continued refusal by the employees involved to
start their shifts, the Employer's "close down" of his garage
at about 7:30 P.M. was not improper.

For his action in doing

so would not have occurred had not the employees first breached
the provisions of Article XXIV.

Consequently, the Union's reques

for pay for the employees for the time they did not work, is
denied.
And for reasons already discussed, mainly that the
grievance procedure and arbitration is the proper forum for any
and all disputes, the employees are not relieved of the work
stoppage prohibition because the Employer owes a large sum of
money to the Health and Welfare and Pension Funds, though I can
appreciate how this might anger and exasperate both the employees
and the Union.
in arbitration.

But that specific dispute has been adjudicated
I have rendred an Award determining the

Employer's indebtedness and directing full payment with interest
forthwith.

I understand that that Award is now before the

court for confirmation as a judgement, which the trustees of the
Funds may execute.

So the proper manner for handling that

specific case has been followed and any other rights which the
Union and the employees may have because of that indebtedness,
in any other proper forum, are reserved.

As that case is not

before me as part of the instant proceeding I find no need herein to respond to certain requests by the Union for additional
orders relating to that situation.

The same is true with regard

to any other motions made by the Union not expressly ruled on
either in the Award or this Opinion.

-6The obligation of the Union under Article XXIV is
explicit.

The Employer contends that two Union officials at the

garage also breached Article XXIV, by leading, encouraging and
supporting the employees' work stoppage.

On the other hand the

Employer concedes that top Union officials at the main office,
namely two who are Vice Presidents/Administrative Assistants
to the President, worked diligently and in good faith to terminate
the stoppage and return the employees to work.

The evidence on

the latter is clear, determinative and uncontroverted.

Messrs.

Pancaldo and Goldberg spared no effort in attempting for hours
after the commencement of the work stoppage to bring it to an
end.

Their efforts finally succeeded in time for the first shift

the next day, October 1.

So in that respect the Union (though

it did not instruct the employees of the contract violation in
writing) did comply substantially with its obligations under
Article XXIV.

The evidence regarding two Union officials on the

scene, Messrs. Bono and Petses is inconclusive.

There is no

evidence that they instigated or led the work stoppage.

The

evidence is contradictory and indecisive one way or the other
on whether they encouraged, supported or condoned the stoppage,
or took all possible steps to end it.

So, though the evidence

does not establish that they did what is required of them under
Article XXIV to either prevent or halt a work stoppage (neither
of them testified at the hearing) there is not sufficient
evidence to conclusively find that they defaulted in their
responsibilities, either willfully or negligently.

Accordingly,

and under the particular circumstances involved herein, I shall

-7deny the Employer's request for money damages for losses
sustained from the work stoppage.

But for future breaches of

Article XXIV, depending on where the responsibility lies I shall
not hesitate to Award money damages where I consider it warranted
The Employer's request for an order enjoining any
further breaches of Article XXIV is proper and granted because
it is consistent with my authority under the contract, my
holdings herein, and with the binding provisions of Article XXIV.
Accordingly such an order is made part of my Award in this
matter.

Also I shall make as part of my Award, those directives

I issued orally at the conclusion of the hearing, which are
not already preempted.

Hence I order that there be no violence

of any type between the owner (or any respresentative of the
Employer) and the employees; and that there be no reprisals of
any type by the Employer against employees because of their
appearance at this arbitration hearing.

My directive that the

status quo of the normal work schedule be maintained is now
fully covered by and merged into my Award enjoining any future
breach of Article XXIV.

Eric y. Schmertz
Impartial Chairman

IMPARTIAL CHAIRMAN. NEW YORK CITY TAXICAB INDUSTRY

In the Matter of the Arbitration
between
Local Union #3036
New York City Taxi Drivers Union
AFL-CIO
and
Metropolitan Taxicab Board of Trade
on behalf of certain member Employers
*****
Local Union #3036
New York City Taxi Drivers Union
AFL-CIO
and

AWARD

Andrea Service Corp.

Further hearings on "past grievances" were held at the
offices of the American Arbitration Association on June 19 and
June 25, 1969.
Having duly considered the proofs and allegations, I
make the following AWARDS:
The grievances of Abraham Glass and Charles King
are settled, based on payment by the Employer
(55th Street Garage) in accordance with my prior
Award concerning the "snow tire grievance."
The grievance of Jack King (Frenat) is withdrawn.
The grievance of Sam Levine (Dover) for break down
pay is withdrawn.
The grievance of Roosevelt Chance (Haso) for two
weeks vacation for the year 1965-196J5 i^jdenied.
The grievant worked 235 days during the vacation
eligibility period and is entitled to credit for
three strike days. The total of 238 days is two
days short of the required minimum of 240 days
worked or credited during the vacation eligibility
period.
The grievance of Samuel Berger (Ann Service) for
two weeks vacation for the year 1965-1966 is denied on the same basis as the Award immediately
above. The record shows that the grievant can be

- 2credited with only 238 days during the eligibility
period, or two days short of the requisite number
of 240.
The grievance of Mercadio Calero (Tedman) is
settled on the basis of payment by the Employer
of one week's vacation pay for the year 19651966.
The grievance of Murray Smith (Tedman) is settled
on the basis of payment by the Employer of one
week's vacation pay for the year 1965-1966.
The grievance of Pasquale Chiarello (Chad) is
settled on the basis of payment by the Employer
of a second week of vacation pay for the year
1965-1966.
The grievance of Bitello Rosario (Lauren) for
two weeks vacation pay for the year 1966-1967
is denied. The records indicate that he is entitled to credit for a total of 239 days worked
(226 days actually worked and 13 days on disability) or one day short of the required minimum of 240 days worked within the vacation eligibility period.
The grievance of Robert Weiss (AAR) for two weeks
vacation pay for the year 1965-1966 is granted.
The Employer's payment of that claim shall close
out all "past grievances" of vacation claims at
the AAR Garage.
The grievance of Cupertino Bernal (Andrea) for two
weeks vacation pay is settled on the basis of payment by the Employer of the sum of $50.00 to the
grievant.
The grievance of Leo Lazarus (Tedfre) for a second
week of vacation pay for the year 1965-1966 is denied . The work records indicate that the grievant
had not received vacation pay in any three years
prior to the year 1965-1966. Hence the year of
his claim does not constitute the fourth year he
received vacation as a regular employee as required
by the contract.
The grievance of Frank Lauri (Level-Sandan) for two
weeks vacation pay for the year 1965-1966 is denied.
The grievant1s actual days worked plus credit for
strike days during the vacation eligibility period
totals 238, or two days short of the required 240
days minimum. As he did not meet the eligible requirements for any vacation in the year 1965-1966,

- 3 his claim for two weeks vacation must fail even
if he received vacations in three prior years.
The grievance of Harry Paris (Lawn Cab Corp.) is
withdrawn by the Union without prejudice. This
grievance may be re-submitted to the Impartial
Chairman when the Union ascertains a better identity of the Employer involved.
The grievance of James Brown, Jr. (Checker) is
withdrawn.
The grievance of Charles Steffen (Checker) for
a second week of vacation pay for the year 19651966 is granted. The record discloses that not
only did the Company grant the grievant vacation
pay in at least three prior years for periods of
service less than 240 days worked, but that its
vacation plan prior to the first Union contract
provided for two weeks vacation after two years of
full time service. I am persuaded that this latter
policy obtained in the year 1965 (Vacation year
1964-1965.) Accordingly the last sentence of
Section 1 of Article VII of the predecessor
Collective Bargaining Agreement is applicable.
That sentence reads:
If the Company in 1965 granted a greater
vacation plan than said one week for one
5^ear and two weeks for four years (for
example two weeks for three years) such
greater benefit shall continue.
Consequently because the Company did grant
greater benefit, namely two weeks vacation
after two years, that benefit shall obtain
grievant's vacation in the summer of 1966
year 1965-1966.)

a
pay
to the
(vacation

There is no dispute that he had worked as a full
time employee and received vacation pay for at
least two previous years as well as one week vacation pay for the year 1965-1966. Accordingly the
Employer (Checker) is directed to pay the grievant 's claim for a second week of vacation pay for
the year 1965-1966.
The grievance of Saul Taub (Checker) for a second
week of vacation pay for the year 1966-1967 is
settled by the Employer's agreement to pay that
claim. But the grievant's claim for a second week
of vacation pay for the year 1965-1966 is withdrawn,
The grievance of Solomon Pinker (Checker) for a
second week of vacation for the year 1966-1967 is
withdrawn.

- 4 The grievances of Garland McMillan, Dominick
De Bellis and Peter Mitrovick (Flex) for a
second week of vacation pay for the year 19651966, are continuing pending further information.
The grievance of Benjamin Azrikan and Alphonso
D. Killens (Checker) each for a second week of
vacation pay for the year 1966-1967 are continuing pending further word from the parties on
the basis of the following stipulation:
If the Company records show that the
grievants received three prior vacation
payments, they are entitled to a second
week of vacation pay for the year 19661967 and the Company will make this payment. If not the claim or claims will be
denied.

Eric 6. Schmertz
Impartial Chairman

DATED: July

1969

STATE OF New York
COUNTY OF New York

)ss,

On this
day of July, 1969, before me personally came
and appeared Eric J. Schmertz to me known and known to me to
be the individual described in and who executed the foregoing
instrument and he acknowledged to me that he executed the same,

IMPARTIAL CHAIRMAN, NEW YORK CITY TAXICAB INDUSTRY
In the Matter of the Arbitration
between
Local Union #3036, New York City
Taxi Drivers Union, AFL-CIO
and

AWARD

Metropolitan Taxicab Board of Trade, Inc
on behalf of certain member Employers.

A further hearing on "past grievances" was held at the
offices of the American Arbitration Association on June 5, 1969
Having duly considered the proofs and allegations I
make the following AWARDS:
The grievance of Stanley Rosenthal (Cordi) is denied.The contract between the Union and t h a t ~
Company, as distinguished from most others in the
industry, was expressly effective as of July 28,
1966, or subsequent to the vacation period July 1,
1965 to June 30, 1966. Because the contract has
no provision for retroactivity, the grievant's claim
under the contract for additional vacation pay for
the year 1965-1966, based on the eligibility period July 1, 1965 to June 30, 1966 is disallowed. I
find that the benefits of the contract were to be
applied prospectively from July 28, 1966 and therefore the grievant's entitlement under the contract
would be applicable to the vacation period after
July 28, or in other words for the vacation year
1966-1967. The provision of the last paragraph of
Article IV which reads:
An employee shall be given credit for all
benefits for the days he was scheduled to
work during the period from May 12, 1966 to
May 16, 1966.
is not inconsistent with the foregoing holding. It
means that in determining any benefits under the contract on and after July 28, 1966, credit (in terms
of service) shall be given for those five days in
May of 1966. But absent express language applying
the contract terms retroactively, especially in view
of the express effective date of July 28, 1966, the
foregoing provision cannot be interpreted to grant a
vacation payment for and during a period earlier than
the effective date of the contract.

- 2 The grievance of Ben A,COCella et al (Worth) is
settled and dismissed as follows: The Employer
(Worth) shall pay Mr. Acocella the sum of $42.00
in full settlement of his claim. All other
claims involving any other employees under this
grievance, are dismissed.
The^^g_rievance of Samuel_Jteg_ans_ (EN Garage) is
get tied. The Employer (EN Garage) has paid the
grievant's claim for one week vacation pay for
the year 1965-1966.
The g^ieyance of JEfrain Endujar (EN Garage) is
d_enjied on two grounds. The grievant failed to
appear after due notice and the available records
failed to show that he achieved the requisite
240 days worked within the applicable vacation
eligibility period even if he is given credit for
time on disability as claimed in his written
grievance.
The grievance of Ern es^ Collette (Vernon-CircleLod) J^_j5ettTLedj_ by the Employer's payment of the
grievant's claim for vacation pay for the year
1966-1967.
The grievance of ^Michael Burke (Fl_e_x])_
prior to the hearing by the Employer's payment to
the grievant of a second week of vacation pay for
the year 1965-1966.

out of J^}__i^^enie_d.
The grievant achieved
_
_
_
_
'onTy~23T dayT worked including credit for the strike
days, and therefore failed to work the minimum 240
days within the vacation year as required by the
contract.
Th^_g_rievanc^e of Joseph McKenna (Cadet) is denied
on the same basis as the immediate foregoing Award.
The grievant is credited with only 232 days worked
including the strike days and therefore falls 8
days short of the minimum requirement of 240 days
worked within the eligibility period of the vacation year 1965-1966.

_

'

The grievant actually worked 235 days during the
vacation eligibility period 1965-1966. In order to
achieve the requisite minimum of 240 days, he would
have to be credited with all five of the strike days,
But credit for the strike days is accorded under
the contract only if an employee would have been
scheduled to work those days. Based on the griev-

- 3 ant's work records, and especially his work pattern
the weeks shortly before and following the strike
days, I consider it highly improbable that he would
have been scheduled or would have worked all five
of the strike days, Wednesday, May 12 through Sunday, May 16. Though he did work on some other
Saturdays and Sundays during that year, his most
consistent practice was to be off on either Saturday or Sunday (if not both) in most of the weeks
involved. Consequently, I cannot conclude as a
likelihodd,that he would have worked both Saturday
and Sunday, May 15 and 16, 1966.
The grievance of thja J^stajte of Vincent Madonna.
(IOTA) is granted by default because of the failure of a representative of the Employer to appear
after due notice. I direct that the Employer involved, who was a part of the IOTA Association,
pay to the estate of Vincent Madonna the claim for
two weeks vacation pay for the year 1965-1966.
The grj^vajice__of Americo Saccavino (WilliamJMain.tgnan^ce^_ is; grant:ed. The grievant is now deceased.
But his testimony at a prior hearing and the available work records disclose that he actually worked
222 days within the vacation eligibility period, and
is also eligible for 18 days credit on Workman's Compensation, in accordance with the agreement of the
parties to credit such time as days worked. This
meets the requisite 240 days worked. Therefore tha
claim for vacation pay for the year 1966-67 is
allowed. When I indicated my intention at the hearing to grant this grievance, the Employer agreed to
make payment of the claim to the widow of the deceased
grievant.
The^gjrievance of Foster Williams (Londal) is granted in part as follows: The charge against the grievant is that he used foul and profane language to the
Employer's lady bookkeeper. As a discharge case,the
burden is on the Employer to prove the charge by clear
and convincing evidence. He has not done so. Only
the bookkeeper involved testified about the alleged
incident in which certain foul language (undisclosed
at the hearing) was directed at her by the grievant.
The grievant in his testimony, flatly denied that
he did so. There is no doubt that the grievant and
the bookkeeper were in a discussion initiated by the
former who sought an itemization of his weekly pay
deductions on his pay envelope (as required by law).
Both agree that the discussion began in the bookkeeper's
office and continued as the grievant left that office
and entered an adjacent dispatcher's office. The
bookkeeper contends that the grievant used the foul
language after he entered the dispatcher's office..

- 4A fellow employee who testified that he was in
the dispatcher's office at the time and heard
the grievant and the bookkeeper in conversation,
stated that he did not hear any loud, foul or abusive
language used by the grievant. He was certain
that if such language had been used, it would have
come to his attention. Obviously none of this testimony can be determinative one way or the other.
But the Employer's equivocation in meting out the
discharge penalty suggests that he too was not
sure of what had actually transpired. The bookkeeper testified that the incident occurred on
either July 21 or July 28, 1967. Thereafter the
grievant continued to work until August 18; then
went on vacation until August 25; and was discharged
not until he returned from vacation on August 28.
So if the incident occurred on the last possible
date, namely July 28, the Employer permitted the
grievant to work more than two more weeks without
taking any disciplinary action against him. And
he also permitted him to go on and return from vacation before he acted to terminate him. It is well
settled that if discipline is warranted, it should
follow without delay the incident for which it is
imposed. If not, as in the case here, two conclusions are possible. One is that employer has either
condoned or decided to overlook the offense and the
other is that the employer is not certain about the
merits. Either way, absent any other conclusive
evidence, it works to cast a serious doubt on the
propriety of any discharge ultimately but tardily
imposed. This is not to say that the grievant did
not use foul and abusive language to the bookkeeper.
Rather it is to say that the Employer has not met
his burden to show, by the quantum of convincing
evidence required in this type of case, that the
grievant committed that act.
However, I fail to see how the full remedy sought
by the grievant can be granted. Neither the grievant
nor the Union on his behalf seek reinstatement. Instead the damages sought is 52 weeks pay at his
mechanic's rate of pay, representing the period of
time between his discharge and his employment as a
mechanic elsewhere. I am not at all persuaded that
the grievant was unable for a whole year to find a
mechanic's job comparable to the work and pay he received at Londal. I am satisfied that at that time
skilled mechanics were needed both in the taxicab
and other industries in the New York Metropolitan
area, and with some reasonable diligence the grievant could have found comparable mechanic's job within a much shorter period of time. I think he could

- 5 and should have done so within at least 2 months.
Therefore as a measure of damages I Award him two
months pay at the mechanic's rate of pay he received from Londal. Londal shall pay that amount
of money to the grievant in disposition of this
grievance.
The grievance of Nathan Weinstein (TMI) which
was heard at this hearing is continued pending
further word from the parties, on the same basis,
and together with other similar grievances, as
noted in my prior Award dated May 7, 1969, which
involve the interpretation and applicability of
Article VII Section 1 and Article XII of the
predecessor contract.

A further hearing on other "past grievances" as well
as "present grievances" is scheduled for July 19, 1969.

Eric ^0. Schmertz
Imoartial Chairman

DATED:
June
1969
STATE OF New York
)ss.:
COUNTY OF New York
)
On this
day of June, 1969, before me personally came
and appeared Eric J. Schmertz to me known and known to me to
be the individual described in and who executed the foregoing
instrument and he acknowledged to me that he executed the same.

IMPARTIAL CHAIRMAN, NEW YORK CITY TAXICAB INDUSTRY
In the Matter of the Arbitration
between
Local Union #3036
New York City Taxi Drivers Union
AFL-CIO
and

Metropolitan Taxicab Board of Trade, Inc.
on behalf of its Member Employers
Award
Local Union #3036
New York City Taxi Drivers Union
AFL-CIO
and
Andrea Service Corp.
Zebra Service Corp.
Jaw Service Corp.

A further hearing on "past grievances" (as defined in
my Award of March 5, 1969) was held at the offices of the
American Arbitration Association on April 30, 1969.
Having duly considered the proofs and allegations I make
the following Awards:
The grievances of Joseph Baglione, Emilio Ramos,
Salvatore Salerno, Julius Rosenzweig and Nikos
Kolaitis have been settled by payment by the Employer (Andrea Service Corp.) of call-in pay to
each of the grievants.
The additional grievance of
Mr. Kolaitis was withdrawn.
The grievance of Julian Ponce is settled. The Employer (Cross County) shall reinstate the grievant, who
agrees to work a regular shift on a full time basis,
starting each morning between 6 and 7 A.M. The reinstatement shall be without back pay, but deemed
as uninterrupted employment with this Employer.For
purposes of vacation pay, the grievant will receive
credit for those days actually worked and credited
as worked under the contract for this Employer within the vacation year.

- 2 The grievance of Sam Levine (Dover) for an attendance bonus for the second quarter 1966 is granted.
The grievant actually worked 56 days during the
eligibility period. If he received credit for 4
of the 5 strike days he would achieve the requisite 60 days for the attendance bonus. In a prior
Award I held that under the contract eligible employees are entitled to credit for the strike days
they would have been scheduled to work in determining their eligibility for an attendance bonus.
In the instant grievance I conclude that the grievant was entitled to receive credit for at least 4
of the strike days. He was a full time driver.
Though his work pattern was irregular, in that he
scheduled his own days off, which were not necessarily the same each week, his pattern of work
both before and after the strike, including the
days he did not work during that period, leads me
to find it highly probable that had the strike not
occurred, he would have worked at least 4, if not
5 of the strike days. And inasmuch as the grievant' s work pattern was acceptable to the Employer,
I find that the days that the grievant worked or
would have worked are the days on which he was
scheduled to work within the meaning of the contract. Accordingly, he shall receive credit for
4 of the 5 strike days, which makes him eligible
for the attendance bonus for the second quarter
1966. His Employer (Dover) shall pay his claim
for that bonus.
The grievance of Ruby Foreman (Jaw Service Corp.)
is granted on the basis of a default because of the
failure of the Employer to appear after due notice.
Accordingly Jaw Service Corp. shall pay the grievant' s claims for one week vacation pay for 19651966 and one week vacation pay for 1966-1967.
The grievance of Louis Wile (Jaw) is granted on
the basis of a default because of the failure of
the Employer to appear after due notice. Accordingly Jaw Service Corp. shall pay the grievant
his claim for a second week of vacation pay for
1966-1967.
The grievance of John Garcia (Jaw) is granted on
the basis of a default because of the Employer's
failure to appear after due notice. Accordingly
Jaw Service Corp. shall pay the grievant's claim
for $1.50 break-down pay for August 6, 1966 and an
additional $1.50 break-down pay for November 5,
1966.
The grievance of Arthur Goldberg is granted on the

- 3 basis of a default because of the failure of the
Employer (Zebra) to appear after due notice.
Accordingly, Zebra Service Corp. shall pay the
grievant his claim for call-in pay for February
9, 1967.

The following grievances are continuing pending
further hearings, or additional information from
either or both parties;
Robert Weiss (AAR) ; Sam Levine (Dover) (claim
for break-down pay; Cupertino Bernal (Andrea);
Nathan Weinstein (TMI) ; Joseph McKenna (Cadet) ;
Foster Williams (Londal); Americo Saccavino
(Williams Maintenance) ; Leo Lazarus (Ted Fre) ;
Samuel Regans (EN); Stanley Rosenthal (Cordi:
Efrain Endujar (EN); the estate of Vincent
Madonna (Iota) : Ben Acocella et al (Worth Taxi)
(covering II grievants whose identities are
known to the parties.
Also continuing on the same basis (per my Award of
March 5, 1969) are the grievances of John Bilges hausen, Michael Burke, Peter Mitronick, Garland
McMillan, George Ruoff, Dominick DeBellis, Ernest
Collette, Abraham Glass.
With the understanding of the parties, the following grievances, which involve interpretation and
application of Article VII Section 1 and Article
XII of the p redecessor contract are continuing pending further word from the parties :
""""feri^*

Solomon FEielich, Salvatore Barraco, et al \,
(Columbia) (a "mass grievance" covering twelve
grievants who identities are known to the parties); Walter Scott et al (55th Street) a "mass
grievance" cover ing Vgr ievants whose identities
are known to the parties; Max E. Smook; Benjamin
Schulman, Burton Stark (Chase); Henry Feldman;
Abraham Nemeroff; Nathan Opal; Seymour Rothchild
(Willow) ; Sidney Binder et al (Garr) covering
18 grievants whose identities are known to the
parties; Alfred Vitale; Percy Classmen, et al
(Butler) (a "mass grievance" covering 17 grievants whose identities are known to the parties.)
Further hearings are scheduled for June 4 and June 5,
1969.

Er ic/J. Schmertz^
Impartial Chairman

DATED: May / 1969
STATE OF New York
COUNTY OF New York

)
) ":

On this j day of May, 1969, before me personally came
and appeared Eric J. Schmertz to me known and known to me to
be the individual described in and who executed the foregoing
instrument and he acknowledged to me that he executed the
same.

IMPARTIAL CHAIRMAN, NEW YORK CITY TAXICAB INDUSTRY

In the Matter of the Arbitration
between
Local Union #3036, New York City
Taxi Drivers Union, AFL-CIO
and

AWARD

Metropolitan Taxicab Board of Trade, Inc
on behalf of certain member Employers.

This proceeding is for a determination of those "past
grievances" for vacation pay arising from the "continuing
benefits" provisions of the predecessor collective bargaining agreement.

Specifically they are the grievances of:

Solomon Frielich, Salvatore Barraco, et al
(Columbia) (a "mass grievance" covering 12
grievants whose identities are known to the
parties); Walter Scott et al (55th Street)
(p. "mass grievance" covering 19 grievants whose
identies are known to the partie£; Max E. Smook;
Benjamin Schulman, Burton Stark (Chase); Henry
Feldman, Abraham Nemeroff, Nathan Opal, Seymour
Rothchild (Willow); Sidney Binder et al (Garr)
(covering 18 grievants whose identies are known
to the parties); Alfred Vitale, Percy Classmen,
et al (Butler) (a "mass grievance" covering 17
grievants whose identities are known to the
parties); Nathan Weinstein (TMI).
Each grievance is for vacation pay (either one or two
weeks) for the vacation year 1965-1966 based on vacation plans
in force at the Employers involved, prior to the predecessor
collective bargaining agreement, and which, in terms of
eligibility requirements or pay were more favorable to the
employees than under Article VII (Vacations) of the applicable
predecessor contract.
The pertinent part of that Article requires that full
time employees acquire '240 days worked or credited within the
vacation eligibility period, July 1 to June 30th, in order to
be eligible for any vacation pay.

The grievances however are based on prior vacation plans which
granted vacation pay for a lesser number of days worked within that eligibility period or a comparable period, or which
paid more in percentage earnings as vacation pay than the pay
formula under Article VII of the contract.

It is undisputed

that the grievants met the eligibility requirements of those
particular prior vacation plans.

But either they did not

receive vacation pay for the year 1965-1966 because they
failed to achieve the 240 days worked or credited, or they
received less in vacation pay than they had received previously
under a prior plan.
On behalf of the grievants the Union seeks a continuation
of those more favorable plans, under Article XII (Continuing
Benefits) and Article VII, Section 1 of the predecessor contract
The BmJi'ijixrti^1' places a different and contrary interpretation
on those contract clamses.
In deciding these disputes I find no need to interpret
those contract provisions (now expired) because over-riding
equitable factors impel a resolution favorable to the grievants
But as an inextricable and therefore necessary part of this
case, my Award must and shall include also a direction on what
the "continuing benefits" provision of the current collective
bargaining agreement (Article XVII), effective November 17,
1967 to November 16, 1970, means and how it shall be applied
during that term.

In short, this Award is both dispositive

of the foregoing "continuing benefits" grievances arising
from the predecessor contract and, so as to be complete,
mandates how the continuing benefits clause of the present
contract shall be enforced in disputes substantively similar
to those of the instant

grievances.
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There is no dispute that the eligibility period within
which to accumulate days worked or credited for a vacation
during the summer of 1966 (vacation year 1965-1966) was
July 1, 1965 through June 30, 1966.

But the predecessor

contract was not signed until the middle of May 1966, ten
and one-half months after the applicable eligibility period
had begun.

So, for almost the entire eligibility period the

employees had no idea what the contractural vacation eligibilit
requirements would be.

It is both logical and reasonable

#

therefore that they would and did work at a pace and with
regularity based on the vacation plan they enjoyed in the prior
or earlier years.

For they had no reason to know or expect

that their particular' plans would be changed by contract
negotiations; that more might be expected of them as a conditio
for vacation pay than previously; or that their pay entitlement
might be less.

Of course where Article VII as negotiated in

May 1966, and applied in principal part retroactively to cover
the eligibility period July 1, 1965 to June 30, 1966, coincided
with or improved on prior plans (as was the case with the vast
majority of the employees), no inequity in the form of a
diminution of a prior benefit occurred„
the effect was different.

But as to the grievant

Unable to anticipate different or

more demanding vacation eligibility requirements throughout
the first ten and one-half months of the one year period, they
were confronted for the first time in May with the need to
achieve a greater number of days worked to be entitled to any
vacation.

An they had less than two remaining months, May and

June to acquire those additional days.

Or again, not until

May 1966 were some put on notice that a lesser percentage of
bookings would be the base fit calculating the vacation pay.
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The basic unfairness of that condition, as an ex post facto
application of a more demanding requirement or a lesser
benefit, without prior notice of its retroactive application,
is manifest.

It should not therefore, deprive the affected

grievants of the vacation pay they reasonably expected to
earn, especially where, as here, for the year 1965-1966 each
met the eligibility requirements of the plan under which he
received vacation pay in prior years, and which for the first
ten and one-half months of 1965-1966 he had no reason to know
or believe would be changed.
Accordingly on that compelling equitable ground Iresolve
the foregoing grievances in favor of the grievants.

I Award

and direct the Employers involved to pay the claims for
vacation pay that are the subject of those grievances.
In view of my ruling on the arbitrability of "past
grievances", which I made at the first hearing on February 5,
1969 and recited in my Award of March 5, 1969, no further "past
grievances" involving claims for "continuing benefits" arising
from the predecessor contract will be arbitrable.
As the Impartial Chairman I deem it essential that the
parties know how Article XVII (Continuing Benefits) is to be
applied and enforced during the life of the current contract in
disputes of this type.

My view in that regard is based on the

conviction that the time has come for uniformity and equality
in the eligibility requirements for vacation benefits and
attendance bonus.

I can think of nothing more inequitable,

unwarranted or damaging to orderly industrial relations than
for drivers, similarly situated, not to meet the same thresholc
eligibility standards.

Any significant discrepancy between

what one regular driver must do to earn a vacation or bonus
from that of another, is totally inconsistent with the regulari ;ed
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standards and equality of treatment for which this collective
bargaining agreement was negotiated.
Therefore, those vacation plans and attendance bonus
formulae which existed prior to the collective bargaining
relationship shall no longer be applicable under the current
collective agreement, and shall not be enforceable or perpetuated under Article XVII of the present contract as I
interpret that Article below.
Article XVII reads:
CONTINUING BENEFITS
Benefits formerly granted on a regular basis
to the employees covered hereby (which were
granted prior to the present contract negotiations
or prior to the contract which terminated on
November 16, 1967) shall be continued, with the
exception of vacation benefits, Christmas bonus
and attendance bonus. In the event it is contended
that the combination of attendance bonus and vacation
payment, as set forth in this agreement, provides
less in total, than a previous combination of attendance bonus, vacation payment and Christmas bonus,
the matter may be taken up through the grievance
procedure, as there is to be no reduction in the
combination of attendance bonus and vacation payment
as provided by this agreement from a prior combination
of attendance bonus, vacation payment and Christmas
bonus.
It shall be applied and administered under the present
contract as follows:
To receive any vacation pay, a driver must first
meet the requirements of Article XII (Vacations and
Vacation Pay) of the present contract. In other words,
to receive full vacation pay he must achieve 230 days
worked or credited within the eligibility period
July 1 -June 30th. For seventy-five percent vacation
pay he must achieve 225 days on the same basis; and
for fifty percent vacation pay he must work or be
credited with 200 days on the same basis. Whether he
receives one, two, or three weeks vacation with pay
depends on his eligibility under

sub paragraphs (b), (c), or (d) of Section 1.
The same shall apply to attendance bonus.

Under

the current contract an employee shall be entitled to an attendance bonus only if he meets
the conditions of Article XI.
The terms of Article XII for vacation pay, and
those of Article XI for attendance bonus having
been met, the Continuing Benefits clause (Article
XVII) shall then come into play on the following
basis:
If the combination of the vacation payment
received under Article XII together with the
attendance bonus received under Article XII
|?l@vias ISss in total payment than what the
employee received previously (before the
collective bargaining relationship) from a
a combination of vacation payment, atterrance
bonus payment and Christmas bonus, he is then
entitled to an/shall receive a sum of money
from the Employer to bring him up to the
prior level.

In other words, a comparison

with the previous combination of vacation
pay, attendance bonus and Christmas bonus
shall only be made when and if the driver
first meets the eligibility requirements
of both the vacation provisions and attendance
bonus provisions of the current contract.
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So, where an employee is eligible for 100%
vacation pay under Article XII, that payment
together with the attendance bonus he receives
under Article XI may be compared with what he
received previously in total from that Employer
from the combination of vacation pay, attendance bonus and Christmas bonus.

But it should

be recognized that if he is only eligible for
75% or 50% of vacation pay under Article XII,
that payment together with his attendance bonus
shall be compared with only 75% or 50% of what
he received in vacation pay previously, plus
his previous attendance bonus and Christmas
bonus.

c

k

Impartial Chairman

DATED: July 1%9
STATE OF New York
COUNTY OF New York
On this
day of
and appeared Eric J.
to be the individual
foregoing
instrument
executed the
same.

)ss :
)
July, 1969, before me personally came
Schmertz to me known and known to me
described in and who executed the
and he acknowledged to me that he

or*
IMPARTIAL CHAIRMAN, NEW YORK CITY TAXICAB INDUSTRY

In the Matter of the Arbitration
between
New York City Taxi Drivers Union
Local 3036, AFL-CIO
Award

and

Metropolitan Taxicab Board of Trade, Inc,
on behalf of Ann Maintenance Corp.

The Undersigned, as Impartial Chairman under the Collective Bargaining Agreement between the above named parties, renders the following Award:
The record before me does not establish justifiable cause for the discharge of Angel C. Cintron.
He shall be reinstated but without back pay0

Eric /, Schmertz
Impartial Chairman

DATED: December
1969
STATE OF New York
COUNTY OF New York

ss.

On this
day of December, 1969, before me personally
came and appeared Eric J. Schmertz to me known and known to
me to be the individual described in and who executed the
foregoing instrument and he acknowledged to me that he executed the same0

In the Matter of the Arbitration
between
New York City Taxi Drivers Union
Local 3036, AFL-CIO
and
Metropolitan Taxicab Board of Trade, Inc.
on behalf of Ann Maintenance Corp.

The stipulated issue is:
Was Angel C. Cintron discharged for justifiable
cause? If not, what shall be the remedy?
A hearing was held at the offices of the American Arbitration Association on December 2, 1969, at which time Mr.
Cintron, hereinafter referred to as the "grievant," and representatives of the above named parties appeared and were
afforded full opportunity to offer evidence and argument and
to examine and cross examine witnesses„
The grievant, a driver, was discharged for "accidents."
He was involved in nine accidents from 1967 to the date of
his discharge, October 14, 1969, three of which took place
during the last three months of his employment.
On the face of it the grievant's accident record would
appear to be excessive, especially in view of the fact that
during the latter months of his employment he worked only portions of each week.

But this is a discharge case, with the

burden on the Employer to establish justifiable cause by
clear and convincing evidence.

In my judgment that requires a

closer look at the nature and circumstances of that accident
record.
To meet its burden of showing cause for the penalty of

- 2 discharge, I believe that the Employer must prove that the
grievant was at fault or otherwise careless in at least more
than one of those accidents, together with some probative evidence as to their nature and seriousness.

In this regard the

Employer's case falls short„
Based on the testimony advanced by the Employer, it
appears that the two accidents which immediately preceded the
last, were not the grievant's fault.

Also the Employer con-

cedes that he requires his drivers to complete accident reports (which are filed with the insurance carrier) on every
type of accident, including minor scratches, dents or damage
which may occur while the cab is parked and without its driver.
As to the remaining earlier accidents (the six in the
years 1967 and 1968, and three others between 1961 and 1966)
the Employer was unable to offer any direct testimony regarding their nature or circumstances, including the extent of
damage, liability or fault.

The only evidence is a written

compilation from the Employer's insurance carrier indicating
the dates of the accidents and whether there was a "property
damage" or "personal injury."

But no testimony of any proba-

tive nature was offered by any representative of the insurance
company to explain that bare information.
Accordingly though the number of accidents within the
period of time suggests possible negligence on the part of
the grievant, the evidence in this regard is not enough for
me to reach that conclusion definitively.

It is quite possible

that in several of the accidents the grievant was entirely
blameless, or they were minor, or even occurred when he was
not driving.

- 3 The facts of the last accident on October 14, 1969 are
known.

The grlevant ran into the rear of another cab. Li-

ability or carelessness could be imputed to him, and therefore I do not find him totally immune from the consequences
of his accident record.

Also, I am not satisfied with his

efforts to obtain other compensable employment after his discharge.

For these latter two reasons, though I order the

grievant's reinstatement, it shall be without back pay.
He is placed on notice however, that his discharge has
been reversed because of the inconclusiveness of the Employer's proofs.

The grievant is warned that any continuation

of this type of accident record could quickly vitiate the
doubt in his favor upon which this present decision is based,
and would impel me to look with more favor on the Employer's
theory that he is "accident prone" and a danger to himself
and the public.

Eric J<r Schmertz
Impartial Chairman

January 15, 1970
Mr.
Ann
248
New

Gerald W. Cunningham
Maintenance Corp.
West 60th Street
York, New York 10023
Re: Local #3036 - and - Ann Maintenance Corp;
Angel Cintron

Dear Mr. Cunningham;
I have carefully considered your letter of January 2, 1970
regarding my Award in the above matter.
At the outset let me say that in the ten years of my arbitration practice I have never had an attorney appear before me
who is more able, competent or conscientious than Mr. Goetz.
Indeed he disagrees with ray Award no less than do you, and has
expressed that disagreement to me most vigorously.
But I suggest that disagreements of this type are inevitable
from time to time, considering that arbitration is an adversary
proceeding, and that with the rendition of each Award there is
a losing side as well as a winning side. And occasionally, the
losing party remains in sincere disagreement with the Arbitrator's
decision. I have no doubt that that is the situation here.
However, I am fully satisfied that my Award is consistent
with the evidence. You confuse procedural "rules of evidence,"
which do not necessarily prevail in an arbitration hearing with
"standards of proof," which are compellingly present, especially
in discharge cases. If there is one arbitration rule that is
well settled it is that in discharge cases the Employer has the
burden of proving the dischargee's culpability or responsibility
for the offense charged by clear and convincing evidence. It is
that standard for the reasons clearly stated in my Award which
I found your company failed to meet.

Mr. Gerald W. Cunningham
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January 15, 1970

I believe Mr, Goetz would advise you that my Award is dispositive only of the Cintron case. Relating exclusively to the
unique facts and circumstances of that case, it is not res
adjudicata to any other disciplinary case based on an employee's
record of "accidents." A reading of my Award should indicate
that I did not find that a record of excessive accidents was not
grounds for discharge, but rather that the Company failed to
prove the excessive extent of Cintron1s accident record because
of lack of evidence of the nature of and responsibility for any
of the accidents but the last.
In short, I did not vacate any Company policy, but rather
found that the Company's proof failed to show by clear and convincing evidence that Cintron was responsible for a violation of
that policy.
•!'-•

You state that as a fleet insured with an insurance company
you are limited in the evidence you can present. You say that
"the only actual information available .... is an accident report
which is prepared by the driver." Yet at the hearing the Company
presented only one accident report (covering the last accident.)
Where were the earlier accident reports? No doubt if presented,
they would have helped your case. Also, the Company conceded
that some of the other accident reports could well have been
based on minor damage to the cab while it was parked and without
the driver. So, as I have indicated in my Opinion, there was no
probative evidence upon which I could determine the kinds of
accidents in which Cintron was involved (other than the last) or
whether or not he was actually responsible to any degree.
Also, I am not persuaded that the records of your insurance
company are not available in an arbitration. There was no indication that you made an effort to obtain such information from it,
or that they refused to supply it; or refused to make a representative available to testify.
Some of the things you say in your letter together with the
attached statement from the Shamrock Casualty Company are matters
which should have been advanced as evidence and testimony during
the arbitration hearing. But they do not constitute "newly discovered evidence" or information which was not within your knowledge or available to you at the time of the hearing. Therefore

Mr. Gerald W. Cunningham
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January 15, 1970

I deem it inappropriate and improper for me to grant your request for a re-hearing or appeal unless both parties to the
arbitration agree. The general principles of arbitration law,
which attach finalty to the Arbitrator's Award, fully support
that view.
Finally, let me again make it clear that Cintron was not
exonerated. Though reinstated, it was without back pay, and
he was admonished that a continuation of his involvement in
accidents could result in his summary discharge.
Very truly yours,

Eric J. Sehmertz
Impartial Chairman

ANN MAINTENANCE CORP.
248 WEST 60TH STREET
NEW YORK, N. Y. 10023

CO 5-91 10
CO 5-911 I
J^,UUd.J. y 2
^ „
X^ / U
January
1970

FRANKDORRIAN
GERALD W. CUNNINGHAM

EXECUTIVE OFFICES

Eric SchrnertZj Esq.
122 East 42nd Street
New York, New York
Re

Award of the Impartial Chairman
in the Case of Ann Maintenance Corp
Discharge of Angel Cintron.

Dear Mr. S c hrne r t z :
I am writing to you regarding the above award
because I believe that the decision is outrageous, and you
have been absolutely unjust in this case.
a) If rules of evidence prevail in arbitration proceedings then our counsel has been
•grossly negligent in not making sure that
proper evidence was brought to the hearing.
This is not meant to be personal but incisively
factual. I don't believe that rules of evidence
as such do prevail, and as a result you have established a devastating precedent without affording all parties the right to present all pertinent
evidence necessary to establish a proper basis for
your decision. This can only be remedied by
hearing re-arguments or by permitting an appeal.
b) As impartial chairman you cannot render
equity in this industry nor contribute to more
harmonious relations in the establishment of decent
and reasonable standards if you do not understand
the critical nature of auto insurance liability
in this industry -- self insured as compared to
insurance company coverage, A self insured fleet
can present reams of information regarding any
accident because that company controls the claims.
A fleet insured with an insurance company cannot
present such a, body of information because that
company does not control the claims, nor have
available to it all of the information . . . an
outside party does. The only actual information
available to us is an accident report which is
prepared by the driver. All private information obtained' by the insurance company is not available to us.
c) Under the above decision you have not only
failed to promote reasonable guide lines of
safety which should be firm and fairly well
defined but instead your award is conciliatory

ANN MAINTENANCE CORP.
248 WEST 60TH STREET
NEW YORK, N. Y. 10023
CO 5-91 10
CO 5 - 9 1 I I
FRANK DORRIAN

EXECUTIVE OFFICES

GERALD W. CUNNINGHAM

Eric Schmertz, Esq.
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January 2., 1970

indecisive and. would appear to blur what
reasonable driver safety requirements may
exist.
d) The grievant above is a ia:xkon
committee man and should be an example
for the other men for safe driving rather
than given "special consideration", for
his deplorable accident record. This employee
was told to attend a driver safety school
and did not. His attitude is all wrong and
the arbitrator recognizes this as a possibility
but dismisses it.
e) The arbitrator has set a precedent
here which vacates a company policy of more
than 25 years standing.
f) A letter from the Shamrock Casualty
Company who is our insurance carrier is enclosed
herewith, which indicates that this driver has
actually cost our carrier $2,750.00 in cash
paid out in 3 years with reserves on open cases
in the additional sum of $1,500.00.
g) Is the impartial chairman aware that
the Insurance company can refuse to insure my
company if Mr. Cintron drives a, cab. and it
is my understanding of insurance law that they
are perfectly within their rights if they
refuse to do so?
The potential impact of this decision is so serious
that it must be reversed. We respectfully request a re-hearing
or appeal or whatever other method you deem appropriate"to
enable us to have this decision reversed.
Very truly yours.
ANN MAINTENANCE
BY; \JjutaJL.cL
Gerald W. Cunningham/

(feualig (£0.
43 WEST 61st STREET
NEW YORK 23, N. Y.
Telephone 582-3410

December 23, 1969

To Whom It May Concern :
Re: Angel G. Cintron
Our records indicate that Angel G. Cintron was
involved in nine accidents from the preiod of February 3>
1967 to date. The value of the claims closed approximate
$2,750.00 and the total amount of reserves on the open
claims is $1,500.00.
Very truly yours,
SHAMROCK CASUALTY COMPANY

Robert Wo Gaynor
President
RWG:EM

PERMANENT ARBITRATOR, MOTION PICTURE LABORATORY INDUSTRY

In the Matter of the Arbitration between
Local 702, Motion Picture Laboratory
Film Technicians, AFL-CIO

and

Award

Movielab, Inc.

The Undersigned Arbitrator, having been designated in
accordance with the Arbitration Agreement entered into by the
above-named Parties and dated October 1, 1968 to October 1,
1971 and having duly heard the proofs and allegations of the
Parties, Awards, as follows:
The discharge of Richard Heid is reduced to a
suspension. He shall be reinstated without
back pay. The period of time between his discharge and his reinstatement shall be deemed
a disciplinary suspension.
Neither party is "the losing party." Therefore
the fee and expenses of the Arbitrator shall be
shared equally.

Eric y. Schmertz
Arbitrator

DATED: February 21, 1969
STATE OF New York
COUNTY OF New York

)ss. :
)

On this 21st day of February, 1969,
came and appeared Eric J. Schmertz to me
me to be the individual described in and
foregoing instrument and he acknowledged
ted the same.

before me personally
known and known to
who executed the
to me that he execu-

In the Matter of the Arbitration between
Local 702, Motion Picture Laboratory
Film Technicians, AFL-CIO

and

Opinion

Movielab, Inc.

This is the first case before me in my capacity as the
new permanent Arbitrator under the Industry Collective Bargaining Agreement.
The stipulated issue for determination is;
Was there just cause for the discharge of
Richard Heid? If not, what shall be the
remedy?
A hearing was held at the offices of the American Arbitration Association on January 29, 1969 at which time Mr. Heid,
hereinafter referred to as the "grievant," and representatives
of the above named Union and Company, hereinafter referred to
jointly as the "parties," appeared.

Full opportunity was

afforded all concerned to offer evidence and argument and to
examine and cross examine witnesses.

The parties waived the

Arbitrator's oath and the time for the rendition of the
Arbitrator's Award as set forth in Section 15(b) of the contract.
The Company charges the grievant with violations of the
Company Rules; specifically excessive absenteeism and being
away without authorization from his work station during his
shift on September 19, 1968.

The Company states that in

addition to these violations, it imposed the ultimate penalty
of discharge because of the grievant's prior disciplinary
record, which includes warnings and a suspension for previous

- 2 infractions.
Irrespective of the magnitude of the grievant's prior
disciplinary record, I am persuaded that but for the specific
incident of September 19, together with the charge of absenteeism, he would not have been discharged.

Therefore, unless

those two specific violations are established up to the standard required in discharge cases - by clear and convincing
evidence - the extreme penalty of discharge cannot be upheld„
Based on the record before me I am persuaded of the excessive nature of the grievant's record of absenteeism.

And

because the Union does not dispute the days he failed to report for work, for the periods involved, I see no need to recite the specifics of that record.

However, the Company has

not proved, to the standard that I require, that the grievant
was away from his work station improperly on September 19.
It has proved that he was away from his work area an unusual
number of times and for lengthy periods, but it has offered
no hard evidence to show where he was or that there was no
excusable reason for his conduct0

The Company's judgment

that his absences from his work station were improper and
violative of the Rules is merely a conclusion based on the
grievant's prior disciplinary record.

But that conclusion is

founded on mere suspicion, and though the Company may be
right, I am not prepared to uphold a discharge based on mere
suspicion.

The grievant's explanationsthat certain personal

needs compelled him to leave his work station several times
during his shift on September 19, although questionable when
viewed in the light of his prior disciplinary record, is not

- 3 implausible, nor is it overturned by any evidence supporting
the Company's view.

And with the burden on the Company to

prove the charge by clear and convincing evidence, I shall not
resolve the doubt to the prejudice of the grievant.
It is well settled that a record of chronic absenteeism,
»
no matter what its cause, is grounds for an employee's termination if that record continues following warnings and lesser
disciplinary penalties.

But as I have indicated, I believe

the Company would not have fired the grievant on September 20
for his record of absenteeism, even if it may have had
grounds to do so.

Rather its decision was prompted not just

because of a continuing absentee record, but more specifically
because of the grievant's absences from his work station during the course of his shift„

Consequently, as the Company has

not proved the grievant's culpability with regard to the
latter offense, I shall not uphold the discharge action simply
because I do not believe that absent the latter charge, the
Company would have imposed that penalty.
But manifestly, because the grievant's excessive absentee
record is well established; because of the well settled rule
that an employer may discipline and need not indefinitely retain employees who fail to report for work regularly; and for
a reason unique to this grievant (to which the balance of this
Opinion relates) a disciplinary penalty in the form of a suspension is warranted under the circumstances of this case.
It is critical to his continued tenure with this Company
for the grievant to forthwith disabuse himself of the notion
that he is entitled to unreasonable special privileges beyond

- 4those accorded other employees.

He compiled an admirable

military service record in Vietnam; was wounded; and suffers a
partial disability as a result.

But this does not mean that

the Company must for long tolerate irregular and inadequate
job attendance.

The dilemma for the Company and the grievant

would be most pronounced if the grievant1s absences were in
fact necessitated by his disability.
that that is the case.

But I am not persuaded

No doubt a few of his absences were

due to visits to the Veterans Hospital for periodic examinations and medication.

But these represented only a small per-

centage of his total absentee record, and I see no reason why
these visitations, with notice to and approval by the Company,
may not continue.

For I do not consider his request to be

absent for those few times each year to be an unreasonable
special privilege.:
But I am not satisfied that the balance of his absences
were required by his disability.

Frankly I think that be-

cause of some discomfort, perhaps at times connected with that
disability, and for other reasons at other times, the grievant
decided to remain away from work, when he actually could have
reported, in the mistaken belief that he was entitled to special consideration0

His testimony at the hearing tended to

disclose this erroneous, albeit honestly held attitude.
So let me take this opportunity to try my hand at directing the grievant toward an understanding of the rules of
employment and a rehabilitation of his attendance record. He
has been warned by the Company; and I believe has undergone
instructional discussions with his Union.

As the permanent

- 5 Arbitrator, I shall add my admonition, in the hope that as
the objective and final word, it will be heeded.
The grievant is expressly advised, and the suspension imposed by my Award shall serve as notice, that regular attendance is an absolute requisite to continued employment.

This

applies not only to coming to work, but also to attending
to his duties and remaining at his work station when he is at
work.

For whatever reason, even if it is beyond his control

or does not involve misconduct, his inability to regularly
attend to his job and duties, would constitute just cause for
dismissal.

But I believe that the grievant has the ability

to maintain a normal and satisfactory attendance record.
Accordingly, he is directed to do so.

Visits to the Veterans

Hospital for regularly scheduled examinations and medication
shall be worked out with notice to and consent of the Company.
If he must leave his work station to take medication, he
shall notify and obtain the permission of supervision.
If the grievant's attendance record does not improve;
or if without satisfactory explanation he leaves his work
area at times and for periods beyond normal bounds; or for
other breaches of Company Rules or normal work requirements;
I would then be confronted with a strong if not irrebuttable
presumption that he is unable or unwilling to meet his obligations as an employee.

And I would have no choice but to up-

hold any subsequent discharge action taken by the Company.
For all the foregoing reasons the grievant's discharge
is reduced to a suspension.
out back pay.

He shall be reinstated but with-

The period of time between his discharge and

- 6 his reinstatement

shall be deemed a disciplinary suspension,

ErLe J. Schmertz
Arbitrator

PERMANENT ARBITRATOR, MOTION PICTURE FILM LABORATORY INDUSTRY

In the Matter of the Arbitration between

'
i

Motion Picture Laboratory Film Technicians
Local 702, I.A.T.S.E., AFL-CIO

'
'
i
'

and

Award

i

Movielab, Inc.

The Undersigned Arbitrator, having been designated in
accordance with the Arbitration Agreement entered into by
the above-named Parties, and dated October 1, 1968 and having
duly heard the proofs and allegations of the Parties, Awards
as follows:
The present assignment of duties to the Raw
Stock Clerks is neither violative of Section
17(b) of the Collective Bargaining Agreement
nor of established custom and practice. The
Company may continue the present operation
of the Raw Stock Room with one clerk on each
shift, pending an early hearing before me on
the question of whether the work load of the
clerks is normal or excessive.

Eric J. Schmertz
Permanent Arbitrator

DATED: April
1969
STATE OF New York
COUNTY OF New York

)ss.:
)

On this
day of April, 1969, before me personally came
and appeared Eric J. Schmertz to me known and known to me to
be the individual described in and who executed the foregoing
instrument and he acknowledged to me that he executed the same
Case #69-Al(d)

'

-

In the Matter of the Arbitration between
Motion Picture Laboratory Film Technicians
Local 702, I.A.T.S.E., AFL-CIO

and

Opinion

Movielab, Inc.

The stipulated issue is;
Do the present assignments of duties to the
Raw Stock Clerks violate the contract? If
so, what shall be the remedy?
A hearing was held on April 4, 1969 at which time representatives of the parties appeared and were afforded full
opportunity to offer evidence and argument and to examine and
cross examine witnesses.
Prior to March 1968 the Company operated two Raw Stock
Supply Rooms, one for black and white raw stock and the other
for color.

The former was located on the 7th floor and the

latter on the 8th.

Each was manned by Raw Stock Clerks.

In

March 1968, the two Stock Rooms were combined into one on the
8th floor.

Though the rooms were consolidated, the work of

the two Raw Stock Clerks on each of the first two shifts remained divided; one distributed color stock and the other distributed black and white stock.

On the third shift the single

clerk distributed both types of stock.
Effective March 31, 1968 the Company laid off the two
junior clerks and re-arranged the assignments so that one
Raw Stock Clerk manned each of the three shifts.

As a conse-

quence both of the single clerks assigned to the first and
second shifts were and are required to handle both black and
white and color stock.

In other words, before the layoff,

- 2 a clerk on the first or second shift handled either black
and white or color stock; but since the layoff the remaining
clerk is required to do both.

The Union contends that the

Company's action is violative of Section 17(b) of the contract and contrary to established custom and practice. Also
it claims that the layoff is not supported by a bona fide
diminution in work within the Raw Stock Clerk classification,
and that consequently the present work load is excessive.
I agree with the Company that Section 17(b) is not
applicable.

That Section, both by title and content relates

to the operation of machines.

Though the first sentence of

Section 17(b) begins with the phrase "The parties agree that
present methods of operation within the laboratories shall
continue without change ...," the balance of the clause, together with a full reading of the entire Section, including
paragraphs (a), (c),

(d), makes it clear that "methods of

operation" relates to the operation of machines.

As the job

involved in this case is neither a machine job nor part of a
machine operation, Section 17 (b) does not apply.
Nor can I agree with the Union's assertion that the
present arrangement, requiring the clerk to handle both color
and black and white stock is contrary to practice and custom.
The only present variation is on the first and second shift.
The third shift work, all along, required the clerk to do
both.

And the third shift clerk is classified no differently

than the clerks on the first and second shifts.
Moreover, I find nothing in the contract which prohibits
the Company from requiring the Raw Stock Clerk to perform

- 3 both assignments.

The contract provides for a single classi-

fication at a specified rate of pay.

It makes no distinction

between Raw Stock Clerks who handle color stock and those who
handle black and white.

There is no dispute that responsibil-

ity for black and white stock and color stock are both properly within the single classification of Raw Stock Clerk. Therefore, just as a clerk has been called upon to perform either
duty, he may now be required to perform both, provided the
work load involved is not excessive.
The last point, namely the quantity of the present work
load of the clerks on each of the three shifts, relates to
the Union's final charge that the layoff was unsupported by
any significant diminution of work, and hence is improper.
The Company has a contractual right to reduce its work force
when the available work falls off.

In the instant case the

Company claims that the available black and white and color
stock work is sufficient to support only one full time clerk
on each shift.

And that this resulted from a diminution in

the work of the Printing Department (which the Stock Room
services) and a re-assignment of "cinexing" and splicing.

I

make no determination now of this question, simply because the
evidence offered by both sides was insufficient.
may continue the present operation

The Company

of the Raw Stock Room, but

the parties shall come before me at an early hearing on the
question of whether the present work load of the Raw Stock
Clerks is normal or excessive.

Eric y. Schmertz
Permanent Arbitrator

PERMANENT ARBITRATOR, MOTION PICTURE FILM LABORATORY INDUSTRY

In the Matter of the Arbitration between
Motion Picture Laboratory Film Technicians
Local 702, I.A.T.S.E., AFL-CIO
and

'
i
'
'
i
'
r
'
t

Movielab, Inc.

Award

The Undersigned Arbitrator, having been designated in
accordance with the Arbitration Agreement entered into by
the above-named Parties, and dated October 1, 1968 and having
duly heard the proofs and allegations of the Parties, Awards
as follows:
The discharge of Renaldo Ojeda is changed to a
layoff effective December 23, 1968, the date he
was terminated. Pursuant to the recall procedure he is entitled to be recalled to fill open
jobs he can perform. As of the date of the hearing a job as Wet End Black and White Developer
on the third shift was open or available. Therefore Mr. Ojeda may elect to come off layoff immediately and claim that job, at the regular rate of
pay for that classification, without back pay. In
the alternative he may remain on layoff, subject
to his right of recall to a job he is qualified to
perform, without back pay, in accordance with the
established recall procedure, when and if such job
becomes available.
The fee and expenses of the Arbitrator shall be
shared equally by the parties.

Eric Jr. Schmertz
Permanent Arbitrator

DATED: April
1969
STATE OF New York
COUNTY OF New York

)ss.:
)

On this
day of April, 1969, before me personally came
and appeared Eric J. Schmertz to me known and known to me to be
the individual described in and who executed the foregoing instrument and he acknowledged to me that he executed the same.
Case No. 69-A5

In the Matter of the Arbitration between
Motion Picture Laboratory Film Technicians
Local 702, I.A.T.S.E., AFL-CIO

and

Opinion

Movielab, Inc.

The stipulated issue is:
Was there just cause for the discharge of
Renaldo Ojeda? If not, what shall be the
remedy?
Hearings were held on March 3 and March 31, 1969, at
which time Mr. Ojeda, hereinafter referred to as the "grievant" and representatives of the above named Union and Company,
hereinafter referred to jointly as the "Parties," appeared.
Full opportunity was afforded all concerned to offer evidence
and argument and to examine and cross examine witnesses.
Also, with the agreement of the parties, Samuel Miller, Esq.,
a personal attorney for the grievant, was present at both
hearings as an observer.
Based on two "negligence reports" and four warning letters, including a suspension, all during the year 1968, and,
all for certain alleged errors in his work as a Relief Color
Developer, the grievant was discharged.
I am persuaded that the grievant made the mistakes which
are the subject of those negligence reports and letters of
warning.

It is obvious to me that the grievant was not and

is not able to perform the duties of a Relief Color Developer,
especially the specific task of operating the Applicator
which develops sound track, under the methods the Company pre-

- 2 scribes for the third shift.

Specifically, the evidence, in-

cluding the grievant's own testimony, reveals that the grievant is unable to adjust to the procedure of interchanging
sound and silent (dailies) developing, which requires activating or disengaging the Applicator more frequently than if
long unbroken periods are devoted to either sound or silent.
And there is no challenge by the Union in this proceeding to
that method of operation.

Also, it appears that some person-

ality conflict exists between the grievant and the third
shift color developing supervisor, Mr. Marino, at least on
those occasions when the grievant is under what he considers
to be the pressures of the Relief job.

In my judgment, there-

fore, there can be little serious dispute with the wisdom of
removing the grievant from that particular

assignment.

The classic approach, is to uphold the discharge of an
employee, who, following warnings and a suspension, is unable
to perform his job duties satisfactorily.

And this Arbitrator

has so ruled in a long line of ad hoc cases.

However, there

are times when the classical rule is either inappropriate or
unfair because of other overriding equitable considerations.
In my view the instant case is such an exception.
Prior to 1968 the grievant worked for the Company for
ten years as a Developer without any recorded trouble whatsoever.

For ten years his work was totally satisfactory, and

the Company does not dispute his present competence as a
Developer.

In short, he has established his ability as a

Developer over many years of service; but the Relief job on
the Color Developer he cannot do satisfactorily.

His ten years

- 3 of satisfactory service and his established competence as a
Developer are not the only equitable factors.

Additionally,

is the total absence of misconduct or wilfull neglect on his
part in his failure to adequately perform the Relief job.
did not refuse to perform his work assignments.
leave his work area without permission.

He

He did not

He did not extend

break or lunch periods beyond prescribed limits.

He has no

record of excessive absenteeism or tardiness.

He did not en-

gage in proscribed activities while on duty.

And there is no

evidence that he did not try, to the best of his ability,
albeit inadequately, to perform the duties required of him.
In other words, he tried but failed on this particular job;
whereas he had succeeded on others.

And it follows that though

he may be unsuited to the Relief job, he has not been and is
not unsuited to this Industry.
For these reasons, unique to this case, I do not find
the penalty of discharge to be appropriate or fair.

Though

the grievant must be removed from the Relief job, he and his
competence in other capacities should not be lost to the
Industry.

Nor, as would be the case if the discharge was up-

held, should the Industry be lost to him as a source of employment after he has devoted so many satisfactory years to it.
What is proper is to disqualify the grievant from the
third shift Relief Color Developer Job as it is presently constituted.

And assuming other jobs were filled when he was re-

moved, to place him on layoff because of inability to perform
available work.

Thereafter he would be entitled to recall,

without back pay, in accordance with the established recall

- 4 procedure, to a

job he is qualified to perform.

That then is what I direct.

The grievant's discharge is

changed to a layoff effective December 23, 1968, the date he
was terminated.

As of the date of the hearing a job as Wet

End Black and White Developer on the third shift was open or
available.

Therefore, the grievant may elect to come off lay-

off immediately and claim that job, at the regular rate of
pay for that classification, without back pay.

Or in the

alternative, he may remain on layoff, subject to his right of
recall to a job he is qualified to perform, without back pay,
in accordance with the established recall procedure, when
and if such job becomes available.

Eric X. Schmertz
Permanent Arbitrator

MOVIELAB, INC. - LOCAL 702
KXS^K SETTLEMENT AGREEMENT.-

CASE NO. 69 A 2 (d)

On April 30, 1969 on the first shift, there was
an alleged work stoppage in the developing department arising out of a dispute over the company's right to temporarily
transfer a black and white negative developer into positive
developing.

On May 2,. 1969 the company brought a quickie

arbitration to secure a determination of the union's claim
that the temporary transfer violated the contract, and on
May 5, 1969 the company made a claim for damages.

On May 8,

1969 the matter came on ./or hearing before the Impartial
Arbitrator as Case No. 69 A 2 (d).

The parties hereby settle Case No. 69 A 2 (d) as
follows:
a.

No less than fourteen days in advance of a

developer going on a scheduled vacation, the company shall
notify the union in writing how it proposes to schedule
other employees to perform the-work he otherwise would
perform - whether by overtime, temporary transfer or a
combination of the two.
b.

Within three days after said notification,

if the union makes request, the parties shall confer for
the purpose of affording the union an opportunity to present
to the company alternative schedules for the company to
consider.

•

c.

Within six days after said notification, the

company shall inform the union in writing which schedule it
has adopted.

The company may implement that schedule unless

(1) within nine days after said notification the union refers
the dispute to "quickie" arbitration and (2) within twelve
days after said notification the Impartial Arbitrator
determines that the schedule violates the contract.
d.

The union acknowledges that the procedure (a)

through (c), shall be its sole recourse respecting any claim
that a schedule violates the contract and that it shall not
engage in or encourage any stoppages or concerted refusals to
accept assignments arising out of such schedule.
L.....
e.

Changes of such vacation coverage schedules

may be made for reasons other than men going on 'vacation if
and as permitted by the industry agreement.
f.

This agreement shall and may not be used by

either party as a precedent for any other department or in
any other arbitration or other legal proceeding or in contract negotiations.
Dated:

New York, N.Y.
May
, 1969

MOVIELAB, INC.

By
MOTION PICTURE LABORATORY
TECHNICIANS LOCAL 702, I.A.T.S.E

